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STATE LIMITED AND PRIVATE OFFERING 
EXEMPTIONS: THE MARYLAND EXPERIENCE IN 
A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Mark A. Sargentt 
A limited or private offering of securities exempted from federal 
registration still may ~have to be registered in one or more states, 
because the state exemptions for these transactions are often dif-
ferent from the available federal exemptions. These differences, 
however, do not reflect a principled allocation of regulatory re-
sponsibilities between the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the state securities administrators, but rather derive from 
historical, philosophical, and structural differences between the 
federal and state securities laws. Recent reforms of the federal 
exemptive .. szstem have produced new concern about the impact 
of these d!JJerences on the capital formation process, and have 
fed to a reevaluation of the goals of state limited and private 
offering exemptions. Reevaluation of the exemptive scheme 
under the Maryland Securities Act in fight of these developments 
has resulted in both statutory amendment and adoPtion~ two 
new exemptive rules. The author, who was one of the dra tsmen 
of these rules, explores their relation to the national an Mary-
fand experience with state limited and private offering exemp-
tions, and examines many of the novel jUestions of policy and 
practice generated by the new Marylan rules. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal securities law provides several exemptions from registra-
tion for private and limited offerings of securities. Limited offerings 
are exempted primarily because of the small size of the offering. Pri-
vate offerings are exempted because the relationship between the issuer 
and purchaser of securities makes registration unnecessary. State se-
curities laws traditionally have also permitted some exemption of lim-
ited and private offerings, but to widely varying degrees. These state 
exemptions are rapidly being transformed. The new exemptive rules 
under the Maryland Securities Act are no exception; indeed, they are 
among the most novel of the new state exemptions. 
This article will describe those rules, explain how they are in-
tended to operate, and analyze the many questions of policy they pres-
ent. It will not confine itself, however, to an analysis of Maryland law. 
Instead, it will also show why the new Maryland exemptive rules must 
be viewed in light of the national experience that influenced their de-
velopment. These rules must be viewed in that perspective because 
they were not drafted in a vacuum: they were drafted with an acute 
awareness of the long standing problems encountered by practitioners 
trying to structure offerings under state limited and private offering ex-
emptions. They were also drafted with an understanding of how recent 
reforms of the federal exemptive system demonstrated the need for 
change in the state approach and created new possibilities for reform of 
the state exemptions. Accordingly, Section II of this article examines 
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the traditional problems associated with most state limited and private 
offering exemptions. Section III then describes how pressures for 
change in the state approach to limited and private offerings have in-
creased as a result of the recent reform of the federal exemptive system, 
leading to substantial reform both nationally and in Maryland. Sec-
tions II and III thus provide the context in which the purpose and func-
tioning of the new Maryland rules must be understood. 
The new Maryland rules were also drafted with an awareness of 
the historical traditions of Maryland securities law. That law has al-
ways reflected a commitment to coordination of state and federal secur-
ities law and to the elimination of duplicative or needlessly inconsistent 
state regulation. This commitment was expressed in Maryland's 1961 
adoption of a revised Uniform Securities Act (Uniform Act) and in the 
exemptive rules adopted by the Maryland Securities Division in the 
1970's. It is also expressed in the new Maryland exemptive rules dis-
cussed in this article, since the changes brought about by those rules 
represent new ways of achieving federal-state coordination. In sum, 
the recent changes in the Maryland exemptions express an essential 
continuity within Maryland securities law. Section IV of this article 
examines this pattern of continuity and change in Maryland securities 
law and provides a historical introduction to Section V's analysis of the 
current exemptive system. 
The current Maryland exemptive system is an outgrowth of two 
1981 amendments to the exemptive provisions of the Maryland Securi-
ties Act. Those amendments required the Securities Division to de-
velop administrative rules to implement the new exemptions. Section 
V of this article explores the nature and effects of the 1981 amend-
ments, identifies the goals of the ru1emaking process that followed, de-
fines the functional relationship of the rules developed in that process, 
and finally analyzes in detail the rules themselves. 
II. STATE EXEMPTIONS: THE TRADITIONAL DIFFICULTY 
The exemptions from state securities registration have always had 
a motley air. The problem is essentially structural: the exemptions 
were originally little more than grudging exceptions to the basic statu-
tory presumption that every securities transaction is subject to registra-
tion. I While broad exemptions inevitably have developed, the blue sky 
l. This presumption was the legacy of the pre-World War I development of the blue 
sky laws as highly paternalistic and comprehensive schemes of licensing securities 
transactions. See L. Loss & E. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 3-10 (1958); J. MOFSKY, 
BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 11, 12 (1971). The first 
blue sky law, adopted by Kansas in 1911, reflected this presumption by exempting 
from registration only United States bonds, Kansas state and municipal bonds, 
and notes secured by mortgages on real estate located in Kansas. 1911 Kan. Sess. 
Laws 133, § l. For contemporary discussion of this statute, see Dolley, The Kan-
sas "Blue Sky" Law, 75 CENT. L.J. 221 (1912); Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L. 
TIMES 37 (1916). The blue sky exemptions have become considerably more thor-
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exemptive system does not represent a systematic harmonization of the 
need for investor protection, the necessity to reduce compliance costs, 
and the principles of federalism. It is, instead, a crazy quilt of practical 
solutions and political compromises.2 This approach is not necessarily 
objectionable, however, since it seems to work, at least sometimes. 
A good example of how this patchwork system seems to work is 
the blue sky treatment of secondary transactions. Although it is diffi-
cult to define precisely the nature of the states' interest in the regulation 
of secondary transactions,3 and although there is no blue sky 
equivalent of the federal concept of statutory underwriter,4 the com-
bined effect of several aspects of the blue sky law does seem to consti-
tute workable regulation. Those aspects include class registration (the 
device by which all securities of the same class covered by a registra-
tion statement are deemed registered),5 the isolated non-issuer,6 man-
uaF and unsolicited broker-dealers transactional exemptions, and the 
exchange-listed,9 blue chip,IO and National Association of Securities 
ough and complex than they were in 1911, but the idea of exemption from securi-
ties registration is still somewhat at odds with the premises of these statutes. 
2. An example is the early effort by the Investment Bankers Association (IBA) to 
establish a variety of exemptions from state securities registration, such as the 
exemption for exchange-listed securities. For a discussion on the activities of the 
IBA, see C. COWINGS, POPULISTS, PLUNGERS AND PROGRESSIVES 69 (1965); M. 
PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 7-20 (1970). As one 
commentator noted, however, "[e]xpediency was the main propellant of [IBA] 
policy." Id. at 9. Since the IBA's real concern was for the issues underwritten by 
its members-the major investment banking houses-it did not propose or sup-
port a coherent system of exemptions responsive to the needs of small as well as 
large issuers. J. MOFSKY, supra note 1, at 12. 
3. As the draftsman of the Uniform Act observed: "Perhaps the most difficult aspect 
of the area of securities registration. . . is the application of the registration pro-
visions to secondary distributions or other transactions not involving the issuer of 
the security." L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 72 
(1976). The problem is more than one of application. Recent studies of the effi-
cient market hypothesis have questioned whether the states have a significant in-
terest in regulating either primary or secondary distributions by widely-followed 
issuers. See Mofsky, Reform of the Florida Securities Laws, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 
I, 22-23 (1974); Mofsky & Tollison, Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60 MARQ. L. 
REv. 367, 368-69 (1977); Walker & Hadaway, Merit Standards Revisited' An Em-
pirical Analysis tifthe Efficiency of Texas Merit Standards, 7 J. CORP. L. 651, 658-
59 (1982). 
4. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(ll) (1982). 
5. Compare UNIF. SEC. ACT § 305(i), 7A U.L.A. 614-15 (1956) (all outstanding se-
curities of the same class as a registered security are considered to be registered for 
the purpose of any non-issuer transaction) with MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. 
§ 11-508(a) (1975) (omits language in § 305(i) providing for class registration). 
The class registration language had been included in the originally adopted ver-
sion of the Uniform Act. See 1962 Md. Laws I, codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 
32A, § 23(f) (repealed and recodified at MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-
508(a) (1975». 
6. UNIF. SEC. ACT. § 402(b)(1), 7A U.L.A. 640 (1956). 
7. Id. § 402(b)(2). 
8. Id § 402(b)(3). 
9. Id § 402(a)(8), 7A U.L.A. at 639. 
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Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) I I secuntIes exemptions. 
Judicious use of one or more of these devices will ordinarily allow the 
free flow of securities in the secondary markets. 
There is growing criticism of some aspects of this "system" from 
both the regulators l2 and representatives of the securities industry, 13 
but it has not generated the kind of trouble produced by the state ex-
emptions for issuer offerings involving private transactions, small num-
bers of offerees or purchasers, a limited aggregate offering price, or 
smaller issuers.14 The past and present difficulty in this area has pro-
duced a renewed cry that the blue sky exemptive system does not work, 
and that some degree of federal preemption may be needed. 15 It 
10. There is no blue chip exemption in the Uniform Act. These exemptions allow 
seasoned issuers that meet specified criteria of duration and stability to avoid re-
gistration of their public offerings. For a discussion of the policy and definitional 
issues associated with this exemption, see authorities cited infra note 13. For an 
example of this type of exemption, see New Mexico's version of the exemption. 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-29 F (1983). 
II. There is no exemption in the Uniform Act for securities traded pursuant to the 
NASDAQ system. For an example of this type of exemption, see MD. CORPS. & 
ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-601(12) (Supp. 1984). 
12. A committee of the North American Securities Administrators Association 
(NASAA) is currently examining the securities industry'S use of the manual and 
unsolicited broker-dealer transactional exemptions to circumvent state merit regu-
lation of primary offerings. The problem identified by NASAA is the use of these 
exemptions to release securities into the secondary markets of states in which the 
issuer did not or would not meet the merit criteria applicable to the primary 
offering. 
13. Representatives of the bar and the industry self-regulatory organization (SRO) 
have urged broader state adoption of securities exemptions based on either blue 
chip criteria or Federal Reserve Board Margin List status. See, e.g., Letter of 
Robert M. Royalty & Robert R. Grew to Conrad G. Goodkind (Sept. 10, 1976) 
(letter from members of the State Regulation of Securities Committee of the 
American Bar Association (ABA) Section on Corporation, Banking and Business 
Law, urging Uniform Act adoption of a blue chip exemption) (copy on file at the 
University of Baltimore Law Review office); Letter of Dennis C. Hensley to Rob-
ert C. Guiod (Mar. 31, 1982) (letter from Vice President of Corporate Financing 
of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), urging state adop-
tion of an exemption based on Federal Reserve Board Margin List status) (copy 
on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review office). 
14. For descriptions of the persistent difficulty in this area, see J. MOFSK Y, supra note 
I, at 19-30; Garcia & Kantor, Dark Clouds in a Blue Sky: An Analysis of the 
Limited Offering Exemption, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 568 (1969); Royalty & Jones, 
The Private Placement Exemption and the Blue Sky Laws-Shoals in the Safe Har-
bor, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877 (1976); Halloran & Linderman, Coordinating 
State Securities Laws with Regulation D and Federal Integration Policy: State Lim-
ited Offering Exemptions and Integration Standards, STATE REGULATION OF CAPI-
TAL FORMATION AND SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 155 (D. Goldwasser & H. 
Makens eds. 1983). 
15. An indication of the renewed interest in the preemption question was a panel 
discussion on that topic held at the 1983 NASAA Annual Meeting. See NASAA 
Adopts ULOE, Endorses Uniformity, Focuses on Threats to Merit Regulation, 15 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1833, 1836-37 (1983). The Securities Industry Associ-
ation (SIA) recently urged consideration of the possibility of federal preemption. 
See Myriad of Approaches to Uniformity of State Regulation Urged at Hearing, 15 
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should be emphasized, however, that there is no single "difficulty" in 
this area, but a complex set of interlocking problems with sources 
deeply rooted in the overlapping state and federal regulatory schemes. 
A. The Problems 
There are three basic problems in this area of state exemption. 
First, state securities acts have traditionally de-emphasized the role of 
exemptions based on the private or limited character of the offering. 
For example, the Uniform Act provides an exemption for "offerings to 
a limited number of persons," provided that the offer is directed to not 
more than ten persons within a twelve-month period,and no commis-
sion or other remuneration is paid in connection with the sales effort. 16 
While the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) adoption of 
Regulation D has accelerated a preexisting trend toward broader fed-
eral exemptions,11 section 402(b)(9) of the Uniform Act reflects the blue 
sky law's traditionally restrictive approach to this type of exemption. 18 
Second, the lack of uniformity among the states has been, and to 
some extent still is, extreme. The draftsman's commentary to section 
402(b )(9) described the statutes in this area as being "sharply and irrec-
oncilably Split."19 Later commentators have made similar observa-
tions.20 Counsel for issuers attempting to blue sky an exempt 
transaction thus have had to contend with a broad variety of bases and 
conditions for exemption. 
Third, there has been a substantial lack of coordination between 
the federal and state exemptions. A transaction exempt at the federal 
level is not by definition exempt at the state level; the issuer has to find 
a separate state exemption. This basic fact has created practical diffi-
culties, because the states have tended to take a more restrictive ap-
proach to exemptions than Congress and the SEC, and because state-
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1737, 1738 (1983). The current conflict among 
NASAA, some states, and bar representatives over the proper degree of coordina-
tion between Regulation D and state exemptions has produced particular interest 
in the possibility of preemption. See Statement of Michael J. Halloran, special 
counsel to the National Venture Capital Association, to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) and NASAA in Connection with Public Hearings 
under Section 19(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, at 9 (Sept. 12, 1983) (copy on file 
at the University of Baltimore Law Review office). 
16. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9), 7A U.LA 641 (1956). 
17. See infra note 159 (discussing development of broader state limited and private 
offering exemption). 
18. For evidence of the persistence of this approach, see L. Loss, supra note 3, at 125-
30 (describing the state of the law in 1956); Mofsky, State Securities Regulation 
and New Promotions: A Case History, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1401, 1405-10, 1415 
(1969); Note, State Exemptions from Securities Regulation Coextensive with SEC 
Rule 146, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 162, 166-67 (1975). 
19. See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 125. 
20. See, e.g., Halloran & Linderman, supra note 14, at 157; Royalty & Jones, supra 
note 14, at 878; Shapiro & Sachs, Blue Sky Law and Practice: An Overview, 4 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1974). 
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to-state uniformity has been lacking. Accordingly, counsel for issuers 
who have structured a transaction to comply with a state of the art 
federal exemption may still have to comply with inconsistent or at least 
additional exemptive criteria imposed by every state in which the offer-
ing is made.21 The net result may be that the state with the "toughest" 
exemptive conditions determines the structure of the transaction, or 
that the offering is registered in some states and exempted in others. 
That latter result may be unfortunate from the issuer's standpoint, since 
it may be crucial to avoid the delay and expense incident to state regis-
tration by qualification. 
B. Their Sources 
These problems have several sources. To some extent, the diffi-
culty is conceptual. State securities acts lack a unified theory of why 
private or limited offerings should be exempted. This results in part 
from the absence of state parallels to the federal law concepts of "distri-
bution," "public offering," and "non-public offering," essential to the 
section 4(2) exemption of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act).22 
The problems also result from widespread disagreement and un-
certainty over whether the state exemption should depend on one or 
more of the following factors:23 (1) the number and nature of the pur-
chasers; (2) the number and nature of the offerees; (3) the issuer's size, 
character, or locus of organization; (4) the size of the offering; (5) the 
manner of the offering; (6) the "isolated" nature of the sales; (7) the use 
of a disclosure document; or (8) some degree of pre-commencement 
administrative review of the offering.24 This conceptual uncertainty 
21. For an explanation of the jurisdictional premises of the state securities acts, see L. 
Loss, supra note 3, at 158 (official comment to section 414 of the Uniform Act); 
see also Long, The Conflict of Laws Provisions of the Uniform Securities Act, or 
When Does a Transaction "Take Place in this State?", 31 OKLA. L. REV. 781 
(1978) (detailed consideration of blue sky jurisdictional questions). 
22. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), IS U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982). 
23. For example, the complex Pennsylvania exemption contains the following limita-
tions, requirements, and obligations: (1) specific numerical limits on both the 
number of offerees and the number of purchasers; (2) mandatory filing of the 
offering document as well as the notice of sales; (3) the seller and purchaser must 
execute a special agreement imposing certain restrictions on resale; and (4) the 
issuer is under an affirmative obligation to amend the notice filing to reflect any 
material changes during the period of the offering. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-
203(d)-(e) (Purdon Supp. 1983); PA. ADMIN. CODE § 203.041, reprinted in 2 BLUE 
SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 48,435 (Apr. 1981). 
Unexpected problems were also caused by one state's former requirement of 
reporting sales in connection with exempt transactions. See Fein & Bright, Private 
Offerings of Securities Under the Illinois Securities Law--Judicial Changes and the 
Needfor Further Amendment, 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 307, 315-17 (1982). If the filing 
of the report of sales is a strictly enforced condition of the exemption, the small 
business issuer relying upon a nonspecialist attorney may violate the registration 
requirement because of the failure to make a simple notice filing. 
24. The Massachusetts Securities Division currently requires substantive merit review 
of offerings to be exempted under the limited offering exemption of the Massachu-
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has inhibited the development of state-to-state uniformity and has pre-
vented true federal-state coordination. The lack of a state parallel to 
the federal "non-public offering" exemption of section 4(2) of the 1933 
Ace5 and the associated "safe harbor" provisions of Federal Rules 
14626 and 50627 has created serious problems for the many issuers en-
gaged in federal "private placements" under section 4(2) and its imple-
menting rules.28 The confusion created by the lack of a common 
theoretical basis for exemption were exacerbated by the states' reliance 
on exemptive conditions foreign to federal law, such as restrictions on 
sales remuneration,29 pre-commencement administrative review,30 and 
the domestic status of the issuer.3l 
The difficulty may also reflect certain preconceptions about the al-
location of regulatory responsibilities. A state administrator may ar-
gue, for example, that certain exemptions from federal registration 
represent nothing less than a deferral to state regulation. If that is the 
case, then a matching exemption at the state level is inappropriate, and 
state registration should be required. The SEC has on more than one 
occasion used this kind of reasoning32 to justify particular exemptions, 
such as Rule 147's33 safe harbor for the 1933 Act's section 3(a)(11)34 
setts Uniform Securities Act. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I lOA, § 402(b)(9) (West 
Supp. 1983); see I MASS. SEC. BULL. 115 (July 1980) ("[t]he granting of a 
§ 402(b)(9) exemption requires an active response from the Division; a thorough, 
intensive review of every offering conducted within the statutory time limit de-
fined under the Section"). 
25. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.c. § 77d(2) (1982). 
26. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1981) (rescinded 1982). 
27. ld. § 230.506 (1983). 
28. These observations are not intended to suggest that the SEC's and the federal 
judiciary's approach to the 1933 Act exemptions has been a model of clarity or 
balanced policymaking. In fact, an opposite conclusion may be more accurate, 
and it is fair to say that the problems with federal-state coordination reflect the 
inadequacies of federal exemptive law and policy as well as those of the state 
securities acts. It remains true, however, that the 1933 Act's concept of nonpublic 
offerings lacks a conceptual parallel in state law, and that has been a major prob-
lem. For descriptions of this problem and how the Maryland Securities Division 
attempted to resolve it through the adoption of Rule S-7 (MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
02, § .02.03.07 (rescinded 1983)), see Md. Sec. Act Release No.5, reprinted in I 
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 15,553 (Sept. 28, 1972); Notes & Comments, Mary-
land Blue Sky Reform: One State's Experiment with the Private Offering Exemp-
tion, 32 MD. L. REV. 273 (1972); Note, supra note 18, at 168-70. 
29. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9), 7A U.L.A. 641 (1956) (limited offering exemp-
tion prohibits remuneration for sales efforts). 
30. See supra note 23. 
31. This approach is no longer prevalent. See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 127 (discussing 
Pennsylvania's former reliance on domestic incorporation as a condition to ex-
emption). Domestic organization or location of the issuer may still play, however, 
a limited role in a state exemption. See MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 02, § .02.04.09C 
(1983) (the "Local Issuer Exemption" under Maryland Regulation 9). 
32. See Securities Act Release No. 5450, reprinted in [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] 
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 79,617 (Jan. 7, 1974). 
33. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1983). 
34. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(1l), 15 U.S.c. § 77c(a)(1l) (1976). 
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intrastate offering exemption, and Regulation D's Rule 50435 limited 
offering exemption.36 The traditionally restrictive approach to state ex-
emptions, however, may reflect a belief on the part of some state ad-
ministrators that other federal exemptions also represent a deferral to 
rigorous state regulation. 
Finally, the state securities administrators' attitude toward these 
kinds of exemptions may have been shaped by their historical experi-
ence as frontline combatants against fraud in relatively small, localized 
securities offerings.37 While it is difficult to quantify levels and types of 
enforcement activity over long periods of time in fifty jurisdictions,38 it 
may be fair to assume that the state securities administrators have a 
perspective on abusive practices in exempt transactions that the SEC 
may lack. 
Whatever their sources, the problems with narrow, nonuniform, 
and uncoordinated state exemptions for limited and private offerings 
have frustrated securities practitioners for many years. The pressure 
for change in the states' approach to these transactions, furthermore, 
has increased because reform of the federal exemptive system has made 
capital financing through exempt offerings more useful and important. 
As these transactions have become more important, the limitations im-
posed by the state exemptions have produced greater costs, greater de-
lays, and greater frustration. In response to these developments, some 
progress has been made nationally toward reform of the state exemp-
tions.39 Reform of the federal scheme was the condition precedent to 
35. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1983). 
36. See Securities Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. 
REp. (CCH) ~ 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982); Securities Act Release No. 6339, reprinted in 
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 83,014 (Aug. 7, 1981). 
37. Long, State Securities Regulation-An Overview, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 541-45 (1979) 
(discussing state enforcement activities). For a journalistic account of some recent 
state enforcement activities, see Welling, Tough Securities Corp., BARRONS, Feb. 
I, 1982, at 8 (interview with Tom Krebs, former Director of the Alabama Securi-
ties Division). A notable example of interstate cooperation in enforcement mat-
ters is the Leviticus Project, a formally structured multistate investigation of a 
variety of crimes involving the coal industry. See Letter of Mark N. Cohen, Di-
rector of Enforcement, Pennsylvania Securities Commission, to Mark A. Sargent 
(Dec. 21, 1982) (copy on file at the University of Baltimore Law Review office). 
38. Some data have been collected, but they are quite general, and provide no real 
basis for historical comparisons or comparisons of federal-state activities. See 
Empirical Research Project-Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statutes: New 
Importancefor an Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. L. 689,797-800 (1982) (survey of 
percentage of office time devoted by state securities administrations to enforce-
ment matters) [hereinafter cited as Empirical Research Project]. 
39. The use of the term "progress" to describe the recent developments in the exemp-
tive area refiects, of course, the author's bias. Others regard the "liberalization" of 
the federal and state transactional exemptions as an unjustifiable threat to the 
needs of investor protection. E.g., Memorandum of NASAA Enforcement Liai-
son Committee to NASAA Small Business Finance Committee 3, Apr. 19, 1983 
("Questionable tax shelter deals have been proliferating. . . . The encourage-
ment of these offerings through unlimited sales and without full disclosure is 
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reform of the state exemptions; the purposes and scope of the federal 
reform thus need to be understood. 
III. PRESSURES FOR CHANGE AND THE REFORM OF THE 
FEDERAL EXEMPTIVE SCHEME 
The reform of the federal approach to registration exemptions de-
veloped slowly. This reform has taken more than a decade, and has 
reflected not only the interests of small business issuers, but also the 
SEC's and the securities bar's interest in developing more efficient and 
less costly exemptive mechanisms. The main directions of this reform 
movement were the reduction of compliance costs (particularly for 
small business issuers) and the elimination of exemptive conditions that 
did not significantly protect investors, such as offeree suitability 
requirements. 
The first important catalyst of reform was the Wheat Report of 
1969.40 This report was the product of an internal study group formed 
by the SEC "to examine the operations of the disclosure provisions of 
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
the Commission rules and regulations thereunder."41 Although most 
of the report's recommendations concerned problems of disclosure in 
federally registered offerings, it also identified what the drafters de-
scribed as the "grave shortcomings" of the then current approach to the 
nonpublic offering exemption of section 4(2).42 This description quite 
accurately reflected the tendencies of federal courts to adopt the SEC's 
narrow construction of the exemption43 and to grant recovery to pur-
chasers by denying the availability of the exemption.44 In essence, the 
Wheat Report identified the conceptual and practical problems that led 
other commentators to suggest that the SEC was seriously undermin-
ing, if not destroying, the practical utility of the exemption.45 
counter to every state securities law concept whether the state has merit or full 
disclosure standards.") [hereinafter cited as NASAA Memorandum]. 
40. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAP-
PRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS 
(1969) [hereinafter cited as DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS]. 
41. Id. at 3 (quoting Securities Act Release No. 4885 (Nov. 28, 1967». 
42. DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, supra note 40, at 155-57. 
43. See SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of S.c., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); United 
States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 850 (1967). For summaries and analyses of this development, see Brooks, 
Small Business Financing Alternatives Under the Securities Act of 1933, 13 V.C.D. 
L. REV. 543, 574 (1980); Kripke, Proceedings Wrap-Up, ABA National Institute, 
Revolution in Securities Regulation, Bus. LAW. 185, 187 (1974); Parnell, Kohl & 
Huff, Private and Limited Offerings After a Decade of Experimentation: The Evolu-
tion of Regulation D, 12 N.M.L. REV. 633, 639-40 (1982). 
44. See Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977); Hen-
derson v. Hayden Stone, Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York Corp. v. 
American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 
440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971); Bryant v. Viand, 327 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1971). 
45. See, e.g., R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 239 (5th ed. 1982); 
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The SEC responded to the concerns of the Wheat Report and 
other commentators through its 1974 adoption of Rule 146, a safe har-
bor for the section 4(2) exemption.46 Rule 146 was "designed to pro-
vide more objective standards for determining when offers or sales of 
securities by an issuer would be deemed to be transactions not involv-
ing any public offering within the meaning of Section 4(2)."47 Many 
commentators felt, however, that the rule merely injected more com-
plexity and uncertainty into an already troubled area, and did not pro-
vide the kind of relief needed most acutely by small business issuers.48 
The SEC did not ignore this criticism, but attempted to balance 
the needs of investors and issuers by shifting its attention to the exemp-
tion under section 3(b) of the 1933 Act49 for issues with a limited aggre-
gate offering price. The SEC had long permitted certain smaller issues 
of securities to be offered publicly under Regulation A,50 an exemption 
adopted by the agency under section 3(b). Regulation A, however, has 
always been a complex exemption. In fact, it functions as if it were a 
type of short form registration,51 and it generates significant compli-
ance costs for the issuer. 52 Regulation A thus did not exploit section 
3(b)'s full potential as an exemption. In particular, Regulation A was 
not tailored to the needs of small business issuers and offered them 
little relief from the burdens of registration. The SEC tried to respond 
to this problem in 1975 by adopting Rule 240,53 an exemption specifi-
cally designed to provide exemptive relief for the small business is-
suer.54 Rule 240, however, was not extensive; it merely offered an 
Coles, Has Securities Regulation in the Private Capital Markets Become a f)eterrent 
to Capital Growth? A Critical Review, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 395, 436-37 (1975); 
Kripke, supra note 43, at 187. 
46. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (rescinded 1982). 
47. Securities Act Release No. 33-5487, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 2710 (Apr. 23, 
1974). 
48. E.g., R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 45, at 248 nn.1-2 (listing articles); 
Parnell, Kohl & Huff, supra note 43, at 639 n.44 (same). 
49. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.c. § 77c(b) (1982). 
50. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-264 (1983). The SEC first adopted Regulation A in 1941. 
See L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION (TEMPORARY STUDENT EDITION) 609-11 
(2d ed. 1961). 
51. 17 C.F.R. § 230.255 (1983) requires tiling in an SEC Regional Office of an offering 
statement at least 10 days prior to the initial offering of any Regulation A securi-
ties. The offering statement receives an SEC staff review similar to that received 
by a registration tiled in connection with a registered offering. For a summary of 
the similarities and differences between offerings exempted under Regulation A 
and registered offerings, see Burge, Regulation A: A Review and Look at Recent 
f)evelopments, 46 L.A. BAR J. 290, 291 (1971). One important difference is that 
section 11 liability does not apply to Regulation A offerings, because Regulation 
A is an exemption. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.c. § 77k(a) (1982); see 
also L. Loss, supra note 50, at 611 (although Regulation A is an exemption, it 
functions as a form of simplified registration). 
52. Brooks, supra note 43, at 565-66. 
53. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1981) (rescinded 1982). 
54. Securities Act Release No. 5560, reprinted in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. 
SEC. L. REp. (CCH) ~ 80,066, at 84,945 (Jan. 24, 1975). 
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issuer having one hundred or fewer beneficial owners an exemption for 
sales of securities totaling less than $100,000 for any twelve-month pe-
riod. Rule 240 thus did not stem the tide of criticism. Although it pro-
vided the issuer with a relatively certain safe harbor, critics emphasized 
that it imposed unnecessary restraints on small business financing, such 
as the limitation on the aggregate offering price to $100,000 and the 
prohibition on remuneration of persons engaged in the selling effort. ss 
The criticism of Rule 240, when viewed in connection with the 
criticism of section 4(2), Rule 146, and Regulation A, reflected frustra-
tion with the entire exemptive system, not just with the individual ex-
emptions. Although this frustration was felt by counsel for all types of 
issuers, it was felt most acutely by counsel for small business issuers. S6 
The special concerns of small business came to the fore in 1977 
when the SEC's Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure urged 
the agency to evaluate the impact of its regulatory scheme on small 
business. Accordingly, the SEC began an extensive examination of the 
effect of the federal securities laws on small business financing. This 
examination began with a series of public hearings held in six cities 
across the country.57 After learning that the small business community 
did not regard Rules 146 and 240 as particularly helpful,58 the SEC 
adopted several significant reforms. First, the aggregate amount of se-
curities that could be offered under Regulation A was increased from 
$500,000 to $1,500,000.59 Second, Regulation A was amended to per-
mit the use of a preliminary offering circular prior to the commence-
ment of the offering.60 Third, the SEC adopted Form S_18,61 a 
55. For critiques of Rule 240, see Carney, Exemptionsfrom Securities Registrationfor 
Small Issuers: Sh(/iingfrom Full Disclosure-Part III: The Small Offering Exemp-
tion and Rule 240, 11 LAND & WATER L. REV. 483, 493 (1976); Kessler, Private 
Placement Rules 146 and 240-Safe Harbor?, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 78 (1975); 
see also Securities Act Release No. 6180, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. 
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,426, at 82,813 (Jan. 17, 1980) (Rule 240 criticisms include its 
limited utility and its prohibition against payment of commissions for solicitation 
of purchasers); Danner, Snowmass Small Business Securities Conference, 35 Bus. 
LAW. 1367, 1371 (1980) (Rule 240 does not provide a practical vehicle for effecting 
small offerings). 
56. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST 
SESS., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO 
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 511, 524-46 (Comm. Print 1977) 
[hereinafter cited as the SOMMER REPORT]. For a symposium on the SOMMER 
REpORT, see Survey: Report of the Advisory Commillee on Corporate Disclosure to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 26 UCLA L. REV. 48 (1978). 
57. These hearings were announced in Securities Act Release No. 5914, [1978 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,530 (Mar. 6, 1978). 
58. See Securities Act Release No. 6180, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 82,426, at 82,813 (Jan. 17, 1980). 
59. See Securities Act Release No. 5977, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. 
(CCH) ~ 81,710 (Sept. 11, 1978). 
60. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.256(h) (1983). 
61. Id. § 239.28; Securities Act Release No. 6049, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 82,046 (Apr. 3, 1979). In 1983, the ceiling on the aggregate offering 
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simplified registration statement for certain smaller issuers going public 
for the first time and offering securities with an aggregate offering price 
of no more than $5,000,000. Fourth, the SEC used its authority under 
section 3(b) to adopt Rule 242 in early 1980.62 
Rule 242 represented perhaps the most significant innovation.63 It 
introduced the concept of "accredited person" purchasers who could be 
excluded from calculation of the number of purchasers to whom the 
Rule 242 securities could be sold.64 Rule 242's accredited person con-
cept was thus the predecessor to Regulation D's "accredited investor" 
formulation. In addition, Rule 242 did not require the issuer to estab-
lish as a condition of the exemption that the offerees or purchasers were 
"suitable," i.e., that they were so sophisticated or so wealthy that they 
would not need the benefits of registration.65 This section 3(b) limited 
offering exemption therefore rejected many of the exemptive criteria 
crucial to the section 4(2) Rule 146 nonpublic offering exemption. 
Since Rule 242 could be used to exempt issues with an aggregate offer-
ing price of $2,000,000, some significant change had been achieved. 
The pressures for even more significant change, however, did not 
abate,66 and the initiative shifted to Congress. The Small Business Is-
suers' Simplification Act of 198067 and the Small Business Investment 
Incentive Act of 198068 produced amendments to the 1933 Act designed 
to achieve significant reform in the exemptive system. 
The first statutory change was the addition to the 1933 Act of sec-
tion 4(6),69 which provides an exemption for offers and sales solely to 
price was valued to $7,500,000, effective March 31, 1984, [1983-1984 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 83,430 (Sept. 23, 1983). 
62. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242 (1981) (rescinded 1982); Securities Act Release No. 6180, 
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,426 (Jan. 17, 1980). 
63. For evaluations of Rule 242, see, e.g., Parnell, Kohl & Huff, supra note 43, at 660-
68 (Rule 242, in conjunction with other federal exemptive rules, provided signifi-
cant safe harbor relief for issuers in search of capital); Note, Rule 242 and Section 
4(6) Securities Registration Exemptions: Recent Allempts to Aid Small Business, 23 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 73,101 (1981) ("rule 242 ... [is] a welcome addition to the 
regulatory scheme"). 
64. 17 C.F.R. § 230.243(a)-(e) (1981) (rescinded 1982). 
65. See Boltz & Wickersham, Small Business and the SEC Recent SEC Initiatives to 
Facilitate Small Business Financing, 56 CAL. ST. B.J. 246, 249-50 (1980). 
66. An important example of the continued agitation was the Snowmass Small Busi-
ness Securities Conference, held at Snowmass, Colorado, on September 27-29, 
1979. The conference was held before Rule 242 was adopted but after it had been 
proposed. The conference report thus included substantial criticism (as well as 
praise) for the proposed Rule 242, together with proposals for more sweeping re-
form of the overall exemptive system. See Danner, supra note 55, at 1370-76. 
67. Small Business Issuers' Simplification Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 
2275 (codified at 15 U.S.c. §§ 77a note, 77b, 77d (1980» [hereinafter cited as Sim-
plification Act]. 
68. Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 
2275, 2291 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.c.) [hereinafter 
cited as Incentive Act]. 
69. Simplification Act § 602 (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 77d(6) (1982». 
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accredited investors,70 without any public solicitation, if the aggregate 
amount of securities offered is $5,000,000 or less. That figure matched 
the aggregate offering price of issues eligible for exemption under sec-
tion 3(b).71 The second change was the addition to the 1933 Act of 
section 19(c), a provision declaring the policy "that there should be 
greater Federal and State cooperation in securities matters,'>72 and di-
recting the SEC to work with state representatives toward that end.73 
Section 19(c) made especially clear that the SEC should work with the 
state administrators in mitigating the burdens imposed on small busi-
ness issuers by their exemptive systems.74 
The major result of these SEC and congressional initiatives was 
the development of the SEC's Regulation D.7s Since Regulation D has 
received abundant comment,76 it need not be summarized in detail 
here.77 Regulation D, although not revolutionary,78 represents a major 
70. The Simplification Act also added a new section 2(15) to the 1933 Act to provide a 
definition of "accredited investor." Simplification Act § 603 (codified at 15 U.S.c. 
§ 77b(l5) (1982)). The SEC later adopted Rule 215 (17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (1983)) 
setting out a detailed definition of an accredited investor consistent with Regula-
tion D's definition of that term. See Securities Act Release No. 6389, I FED. SEC. 
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982); see also Parnell, Kohl & Huff, supra note 
43, at 672, 679-81 (Regulation D definition of accredited investor). 
71. Incentive Act § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 77c(b) (1982)). 
72. Id. § 505(c)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.c. § 77s(c)(2) (1982)). 
73. Id. § 505(c)(l) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(I) (1982)). 
74. Id. § 505(c)(3)(C) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(3)(C) (1982)). 
75. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-506 (1983). 
76. E.g., H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 1983 lxi-lxx, 137-54 (1983); 
J. HICKS, 1983 LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTIONS: REGULATION D (1983); L. Loss, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 372-75 (1983); Donahue, New Ex-
emptionsfrom the Registration Requirements of the Securities Act 0/ 1933: Regula-
tion D, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 235 (1982); Parnell, Kohl & Huff, supra note 43, at 673-
84; Russell, A Proposed West Virginia Response to the Initiative 0/ Regulation D, 85 
W. VA. L. REV. 59, 73-79 (1982); Sachs & Attman, Raising Capitalfor Small Busi-
nesses by the Private Placement of Securities-The New Federal and Maryland 
Rules, MD. B.J., June 1982, at 4; Warren, A Review of Ref(Ulation D: The Present 
Exemption Regimenfor Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933,33 AM. 
U.L. REV. 355 (1982); Note, Regulation D: Coherent Exemptions for Small Busi-
nesses Under the Securities Act of 1933,24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 121 (1982). 
77. Regulation D consists of six interrelated rules. Rules 501-502 set forth definitions 
and conditions applicable to the specific exemptions provided in Rules 504-506. 
Rule 503 states a notice filing requirement. Rule 504, adopted under section 3(b) 
of the 1933 Act, provides a simple exemption for offerings with an aggregate offer-
ing price of no more than $500,000. Rule 504 replaces former Rule 240. Rule 
505, also adopted under section 3(b), provides a more complex exemption for of-
ferings with an aggregate offering price of no more than $5,000,000. It replaces 
former Rule 242. Rule 506 is a safe harbor under section 4(2) of the 1933 Act, and 
replaces former Rule 146. There is no dollar ceiling for Rule 506 transactions, but 
Rule 506 imposes certain exemptive conditions not applied under Rules 504 or 
505. For more detailed summary of Regulation D, see authorities cited supra note 
76. Because of the substantial coordination of the new Maryland exemptive rules 
and Regulation D, some aspects of Regulation D will be considered below in 
more detail. See infra text accompanying notes 189-216. 
78. For critical discussion of Regulation 0, see Kripke, Has the SEC Taken the Dead 
Wood Out o/its Disclosure System?, 8 Bus. LAW. 833 (1983); Nimkin, Offeree So-
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attempt to eliminate three general problems: (1) the conceptual and ter-
minological inconsistencies fostered by the ad hoc character of the pre-
existing federal exemptive system; (2) the low dollar ceilings imposed 
on section 3(b) exemptions; and (3) the serious compliance problems 
generated by the offeree suitability requirements of section 4(2) and 
Rule 146. These substantial changes, furthermore, meant more than 
reform of Jedera/law: Regulation D also created a new framework for 
substantial federal-state coordination. 
Regulation D created this framework because it is, at least in com-
parison to the preexisting system, relatively coherent, systematic, and 
justifiable as a balancing of the needs of investor protection and capital 
formation,19 In addition, since Regulation D promises to be a major 
financing device for both large and small issuers, substantial pressure 
has been placed on the states by the SEC, the securities industry, and 
the bar to conform to some aspects of the Regulation D approach. 
The SEC's adoption of Regulation D has forced state administra-
tors to rethink the conceptual premises of their exemptive systems, their 
approach to the allocation of regulatory responsibilities, and the bal-
ance to be struck between their traditional concern for investor protec-
tion and the need to reduce the costs of capital formation. The state 
response to Regulation D, although by no means uniform,80 reflects a 
serious effort by state administrators to accomplish that rethinking and 
to create a state exemptive system that is both practicable and theoreti-
cally coherent. This article will not survey the universe of state re-
sponses to Regulation D. Instead, it will analyze how the exemptive 
system under the Maryland Securities Act has been revised to facilitate 
federal-state coordination and capital formation, particularly small 
business capital formation. This article will also explain how the recent 
revision of the Maryland exemptive system used the reform of the fed-
eral exemptive system to mitigate the problems traditionally associated 
with the blue sky treatment of limited and private offerings. 
The impact of the recent revisions, however, must be analyzed in 
light of the historical development of limited and private offering ex-
phistication in Private Offerings, 15 REV. SEC. REG. 863 (1982); Schneider, Regula-
tion D-Evaluation and Critique, 15 REV. SEC. REG. 983 (1982); Seldin, Who Cares 
About Accredited Investors?, 15 REV. SEC. REG. 810 (1982). 
79. Not everyone would agree with this statement. Some critics feel that Regulation 
D does not go far enough toward remedying some basic flaws in the exemptive 
system. See authorities cited supra note 78. Others feel that the Regulation D 
exemptions will encourage abusive offerings. See, e.g., Seligman, The Historical 
Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. I, 61 (1983) 
("the commission did a disservice . . . to investors in recommending substantial 
increases in the size of the section 3(b) exemption before the commission had 
adequately studied the implication of the increases"); NASAA Memorandum, 
supra note 39, at 2 ("The [state] adoption of Rule 506 ... would cause increased 
enforcement problems"). 
80. For a recent survey of the state responses, see Halloran & Linderman, supra note 
14, at 179-239. 
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emptions under the Maryland Securities Act. Accordingly, this analy-
sis will begin with a short review of the background to reform. 
IV. BACKGROUND TO REFORM: CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE UNDER THE MARYLAND SECURITIES 
ACT 
A. The 1962 Enactment and the Principle of Coordination 
The first Maryland blue sky statute, which was enacted in 1920,81 
differed dramatically from the far-reaching, paternalistic statutes of the 
Midwest.82 Although the statute empowered the state's attorney gen-
eral to investigate possible securities frauds and to issue an order di-
recting the offender to cease and desist therefrom,83 it did not define 
securities fraud as a crime, require securities registration, or mandate 
delivery of a disclosure document to offerees or purchasers. The Gen-
eral Assembly amended the statute in 1937 to require limited licensing 
of persons selling securities in the state,84 but no other effort was made 
to expand the scope of Maryland securities regulation until 1961.85 
By 1961, the Uniform Act, or major parts of it, had been adopted 
in fourteen states.86 Most states, regardless of whether they had 
adopted the Uniform Act, required the registration of securities offer-
ingS.87 Maryland thus found itself in a somewhat anomalous position. 
This sense of being out of the mainstream of modern securities regula-
tion, when coupled with a perception of a sizable increase in the 
number of securities dealers registered in Maryland and in the volume 
of securities sold in the state,88 led to action. In 1961, the governor 
appointed the Committee to Study the Administration of the Blue Sky 
81. 1920 Md. Laws 552 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, §§ 16-17 (repealed 
1962». 
82. See supra note I (sources discussing original midwestern approach). The 1920 
Maryland legislation was typical of the approach of several eastern states-an-
tifraud jurisdiction and no registration of securities offerings. See J. EDELMAN, 
SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE 48 STATES 18 (1942) (only New York, New 
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Connecticut had antifraud statutes). For a con-
temporary attack on the original midwestern approach to blue sky regulation and 
a defense of what would become the eastern alternative, see Perrin, The "Blue 
Sky" Laws, 10 BENCH & BAR (N.S.) 483, 495-96 (1916). 
83. 1920 Md. Laws 552 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, §§ 16-17 (repealed 
1962». 
84. 1937 Md. Laws 348 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, §§ IOA-IOC, 12, 14 
(repealed 1962». 
85. For brief descriptions of the pre-1961 regulatory system, see REPORT OF COMMIT-
TEE TO STUDY THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BLUE SKY LAW OF MARYLAND TO 
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND 1-2 
(Oct. II, 1961) [hereinafter cited as MARYLAND REPORT); Miller, A Prospectus on 
the Maryland Securities Act, 23 MD. L. REV. 289, 289-90 (1963). 
86. Miller, supra note 85, at 291. 
87. MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 85, at 5. 
88. Id. at 1. 
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Law in Maryland (Study Committee).89 The Study Committee's Re-
port recommended the adoption of a modified version of the Uniform 
Act,90 and the creation of a Division of Securities (Division) within the 
State Law Department.91 
The subsequent legislative adoption in 1962 of a modified version 
of the Uniform Act92 represented a significant expansion of the regula-
tory scheme. The statute created a new administrative agency, re-
quired registration of securities, imposed stricter conditions for 
registration of broker-dealers, and defined a set of civil and criminal 
liabilities-all novelties in Maryland. The Maryland version of the 
Uniform Act also reflected, however, the Study Committee's desire to 
make state regulation practicable through maximum coordination be-
tween state and federal law. This principle has become a key charac-
teristic of Maryland securities regulation, and has provided an essential 
element of continuity throughout more than twenty years of statutory 
and administrative change. Indeed, this principle was one of the pri-
mary sources of the exemptive concepts used in the new regulations 
described below,93 as an overview of the Maryland Securities Act (Act) 
and the rules issued thereunder will show. 
This principle was clearly expressed in three aspects of the original 
Act. First, the Study Committee excluded from the Act those provi-
sions of the Uniform Act that permitted the administrator to deny re-
gistration to an offering because of excessive compensation to 
underwriters, sellers, and promoters.94 By excluding those provisions, 
the Study Committee refused to follow the Uniform Act in adopting 
some of the typical blue sky standards governing the substantive merits 
of the underlying transactions.95 Accordingly, the Study Committee 
also declined to follow the example of the many non-Uniform Act ju-
risdictions that permitted the administrator to deny registration be-
89. Id The Chairman of the Study Committee was Arthur W. Machen, Jr., a mem-
ber of the Maryland Bar. 
90. Id at 6. 
91. Id at 7. 
92. Maryland Securities Act, 1962 Md. Laws. I (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, 
§§ 13-44 (repealed 1975 and recodified at MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. 
§§ 11-10 1 to -805 (1975)). 
93. See infra text accompanying notes 152-330. 
94. SeeUNIF. SEC. ACT § 306(a)(F), 7A U.L.A. 621 (1956) (permitting denial, suspen-
sion, or revocation of effectiveness on the ground that "the offering has been or 
would be made with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and sellers' dis-
counts, commissions, or other compensation, or promoters' profits or participa-
tion, or unreasonable amounts or kinds of options"). The Maryland statute also 
omitted those provisions of the Uniform Act that permit the administrator to re-
quire impoundment of the offering proceeds or place in escrow the offering pro-
ceeds of promoter's stock. Id § 305(g), 7A U.L.A. at 614. These regulatory 
devices are typical of the merit statutes and are foreign to the 1933 Act. 
95. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 85 (many merit states imposed limitations on selling 
costs, promoters' profits, and options issued to underwriters, promoters, insiders, 
and other persons). 
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cause the offering was not "fair, just and equitable" with respect to the 
investing public.96 Its Report identifies the basis for this departure 
from the Uniform Act and blue sky tradition: the drafters were "adher-
ing strongly to the philosophy of disclosure as reflected in the Securities 
Act of 1933."97 Although the Report does not articulate its premises in 
detail, the rejection of merit regulation in favor of disclosure regulation 
reflected a conviction that Maryland and federal securities regulation 
should operate upon similar principles.98 
96. Id. at 84 (California and Kansas are examples of states imposing a "fair, just and 
equitable" standard). 
97. MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 85, at 6. This language was used to support the 
Study Committee's recommendation that the new Maryland statute require deliv-
ery of a prospectus in connection with the offering. The Uniform Act left the 
question of prospectus delivery to the discretion of the administrator. UNIF. SEC. 
ACT § 304(a), 7A U.L.A. 612 (1956); see L. Loss, supra note 3, at 61-63. 
The disclosure premises of the new Maryland statute were also expressed by 
Decatur H. Miller, the first Maryland Securities Commissioner, who stated that 
the statute "regulates certain offerings of securities with the principal purpose of 
assuring that full disclosure of the material facts will be made to every prospective 
investor." Miller, supra note 85, at 292. 
98. It is unclear whether a residual merit authority can be found in MD. CORPS. & 
ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-511(a)(5) (1975), which permits the administrator to 
deny, suspend, or revoke the effectiveness of any registration statement on the 
grounds that "[tJhe offering has worked or tended to work a fraud on purchasers 
or would so operate." The Division has, in a very few instances, informally inter-
preted this provision as giving it the authority to deny effectiveness to clearly egre-
gious offerings, even in the absence of true disclosure problems. The Division's 
disclosure of its intention to rely on this subsection has typically led the would be 
registrant to withdraw the registration statement. 
Although the Division has used this interpretation only in a very few cases 
involving offerings with a high potential for abuse, the authority for the interpre-
tation remains unclear. First, § 11-511(a)(I) authorizes the Commissioner to 
deny, suspend, or revoke effectiveness if the registration statement "contains any 
statement which was, in the light of the circumstances under which it was made, 
false or misleading with respect to any material fact." This separate provision 
allows the Commissioner to act on the basis of fraudulent statements or omissions 
contained within the filing. Section 11-511(a)(5), like UNIF. SEC. ACT 
§ 306(a)(2)(E), 7A U.L.A. 620-21 (1956), must allow the Commissioner to do 
something else. The problem is defining that "something else." Unfortunately, 
the draftsman's commentary to UNIF. SEC. ACT. § 306(a) is cryptic, and provides 
little guidance: 
Clause (E): This clause, after Clause (F), is one which gives the Admin-
istrator the greatest amount of discretion. On the one hand, § 401(d) 
codifies the traditional view that the term "fraud" in securities legislation 
is not limited to common-law deceit. On the other hand, Clause (E) is 
not meant to be as broad as the old "sound business principles" standard 
in Kansas, for example, or the "fair, just, and equitable" standard in 
California. Somewhere between the narrow limitation of common-law 
deceit and the opposite extreme of permitting the Administrator to sub-
stitute his business judgment for the registrant's, a degree of flexibility 
seems to be essential. Substantially, the Clause (E) standard is today 
universal or almost so. It could not be deleted, as two or three commen-
tators suggested it should be, without going over to a purely disclosure 
philosophy which is simply not the philosophy of the overwhelming ma-
jority of the blue sky laws and the problem could not be altogether 
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Second, the new Act permitted registration by coordination with 
Regulation A99 offerings. 100 This was not a common provision at that 
time, and expressed clearly the Study Committee's desire to promote 
the coordination of state and federal regulation: "We recommend ex-
tension of the coordination principle to filings under Regulation A so 
that any offering which is registered under the 1933 Act or qualified for 
exemption from registration under federal administrative regulation 
may be registered for local sale by following the simplest possible coor-
dination procedure."101 
Third, and most important for purposes of this article, the new 
avoided even under a disclosure statute, as the federal experience has 
richly demonstrated. 
L. Loss, supra note 3, at 84-85. 
Loss gave us flexibility, but his commentary does not explain how much flexi-
bility has been granted. In addition, his commentary provides little guidance for 
the interpretation of this language in the context of a version of t.he Uniform Act 
from which al/ other merit provisions have been excised. 
The author is aware of three different interpretations of this language com-
mon to the Uniform Act and the Maryland statute. The first is the restrictive 
interpretation suggested by the first Maryland Securities Commissioner. Refer-
ring to the "work a fraud" language, the Commissioner stated: "[t]his of course 
covers the situation where the fraud inheres in the methods used to sell the securi-
ties rather than in the registration statement." Miller, supra note 85, at 305. 
Miller cites no authority for this proposition, but it is perhaps supported by a 
literal reading of the statute. Section 11-511(a)(I) permits denial of effectiveness 
when the fraud inheres in the "registration statement." Section 11-511(a)(I) per-
mits denial when the fraud inheres in the "offering." The literal language thus 
may contemplate only a difference in the manner and timing of the fraud: in the 
filing or in the sales effort. 
The second is the interpretation applied informally by the Division in recent 
years. As described above, this interpretation would permit the Division to deny 
effectiveness to the clearly egregious offering. This interpretation has been ap-
plied, furthermore, on the premises that these offerings are infrequent, and that 
this language cannot support a scheme of routine and detailed merit regulation. 
The third and most expansive interpretation is that currently being applied 
by the Massachusetts Securities Division. The agency apparently reads the same 
language in the Massachusetts statute (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 lOA, § 30-
6(a)(2)(E) (West Supp. 1983» as permitting full-scale "fair, just and equitable" 
merit review of every registered offering. See Empiricar Research Project, supra 
note 38, at 809. This interpretation has been severely criticized as inconsistent 
with both the draftsman's commentary and the official comment to the Uniform 
Act. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 81-83; see Honig, Massachusetts Securities Regula-
tion: In Search of the Fulcrum, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 469, 474-76 (1984); Honig, 
Massachusetts Securities Regulation: An Evolving Matrix, B. BAR J., Nov. 1983, at 
10. 
The inconsistency of these three interpretations underscores the need for a 
formal administrative interpretation of this language or statutory change. 
99. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251 to .264 (1983). 
100. MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 21(d) (repealed and recodified at MD. CORPs. & 
ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-503(d) (1975». 
101. See MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 85, at 42. The Study Committee also stated: 
"We also recommend that certain minor changes be made in the administrative 
provisions of the Uniform Act to eliminate needless local controls over coordi-
nated offerings." Id. 
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Act's version of the Uniform Act's section 402(b)(9) exemption repre-
sented an attempt to approximate the federal exemption, as it was then 
understood, under section 4(2) of the 1933 Act. Section 402(b)(9) ex-
empted only transactions pursuant to offers to not more than ten per-
sons during any period of twelve consecutive months, if the seller 
reasonably believed that all the buyers in this state were purchasing for 
investment, and no commission or other remuneration was paid or 
given directly or indirectly for soliciting any prospective buyer. 102 In 
contrast, the Act exempted under section 26(b)(9) "any transaction pur-
suant to an offer directed by the offeror to not more than twenty-jive 
persons," and it dropped the prohibition on sales remuneration,103 dif-
ferences reflecting a desire to make the Maryland exemption more con-
sistent with federal law. 
The Maryland exemption was made more consistent with the fed-
eral exemption by raising the ceiling on offerees to twenty-five (the 
maximum number of offerees then thought to be permissible under an 
early SEC interpretation of section 4(2),104 and eliminating the Uni-
form Act's prohibition against remuneration of persons engaged in the 
selling effort, a concept foreign to section 4(2). In short, the general 
commitment to substantial coordination of Maryland and federal se-
curities regulation was specifically expressed in the new Act's exemp-
tion for private and limited offerings of securities. 105 It is difficult, 
however, to determine how well the section 26(b )(9) statutory exemp-
102. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9), 7A U.L.A. 641 (1956). This section exempted: 
any transaction pursuant to an offer directed by the offeror to not more 
than ten persons ... in this state during any period of twelve consecu-
tive months, whether or not the offeror or any of the offerees is then 
present in this state, if (A) the seller reasonably believes that all buyers 
in this state ... are purchasing for investment, and (B) no commission 
or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting 
any prospective buyer in this state. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
103. MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 26(b)(9) (1957) (emphasis added) (repealed and re-
codified at MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(9) (1975». 
104. The 25 offeree rule of thumb applied in 1961 was based largely on an early opin-
ion of the SEC General Counsel that indicated that under ordinary circumstances 
an offering to approximately 25 or fewer persons would presumably not involve a 
public offering. Securities Act Release No. 33-285, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~~ 
2740-2744 (Jan. 24, 1935). See L. Loss, supra note 50, at 661-62 (1961); Section 
4(2) and Statutory Law, 31 Bus. LAW. 485, 486 (1975). By 1969, however, Loss 
remarked that "one can no longer assume that an offering to not more than 
twenty-five persons (or any lesser number) will be considered exempt. ... " L. 
Loss, supra note 50, at 2644; see a/so L. Loss, supra note 76, at 370-71. 
105. The Committee formed to analyze the administration of the blue sky law in 
Maryland stated: 
Since the number of 25 offerees is often considered a rule of thumb for 
gauging the eligibility of a transaction for the private sale exemption in 
Section 4(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, we suggest that this figure be 
used in § 26(b )(9) of the Securities Act . . . . 
We have also deleted a condition (albeit subject to waiver by the 
Commissioner) in the Uniform Act prohibiting the payment of any com-
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tion of the 1962 enactment "worked" without empirical data demon-
strating how the Division implemented its exemptive policies and how 
the private bar adapted its practice to those policies. The following 
evaluation, therefore, reflects informal observation of the Maryland ex-
perience with this exemption. 
B. The Evolution oj'Rule S-7 
Many nonspecialist practitioners seemingly read the section 
26(b )(9) exemption in a simplistic manner. They tended to ignore the 
statutory language requiring the seller to establish a reasonable belief 
in the purchaser's investment intent, and they either ignored or failed 
to discover the Division's informal policy requiring offeree sophistica-
tion as a condition of the exemption. \06 In short, these practitioners 
regarded the twenty-five offeree limit as the only criterion. In addition, 
they sometimes tended to read the number twenty-five as applying to 
purchasers rather than ojferees, as if there were no difference between 
the two. Indeed, it is still possible today to hear the nonspecialist argue 
that if his client sells to no more than twenty-five persons, the client will 
be "safe" in Maryland. This problem was compounded by a tendency 
among more careful but perhaps less scrupulous practitioners to sell to 
no more than twenty-five persons and then, in communications with 
the Division, to reconstruct the number of offerees to make the offering 
appear to comply with the statute. \07 From the investor protection per-
spective, therefore, section 26(b)(9) created problems. Its apparent sim-
plicity led to naive oversimplification and misreading, because the 
statute's brief reference to investment intent was often ignored, and the 
Division's informal policy requiring offeree sophistication might be 
either ignored or unknown. The limitation on the number of offers, 
furthermore, provided relatively little social benefit since it was difficult 
to enforce, \08 and it imposed a questionable burden on the small busi-
ness enterprise seeking to raise a limited amount of capital. \09 
To experienced securities law practitioners, section 26(b)(9) was 
not simple, but was instead a complex trap for the unwary. The sense 
of complexity arose because the principle of coordination had led to a 
tradition of analyzing section 26(b )(9) in terms of section 4(2) of the 
mission or other remuneration in private transactions. This condition is 
not imposed by the SEC, and it seems to us needlessly restrictive. 
MARYLAND REPORT, supra note 85, at 46. 
106. Maryland Securities Act Release No.5, at 3-4 (Sept. 28, 1972) [hereinafter cited as 
Release No.5] (this Release is no longer published in the BLUE SKY L. REP. 
(CCH), but is on file with the Division). A dismaying reflection of this tendency is 
Hohensee v. State, 42 Md. App. 329, 339,400 A.2d 455, 461 (1979). See infra text 
accompanying notes 137-141. 
107. See Release No.5, supra note 106, at 3-4; Notes & Comments, supra note 28, at 
280. 
108. See Release No.5, supra note 106, at 5; Notes & Comments, supra note 28, at 280. 
109. See Release No.5, supra note 106, at 6. 
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1933 Act. Accordingly, the confusion over the section 4(2) exemption 
that developed in the late 1960's and early 1970'S110 spread to section 
26(b)(9). The practitioner involved in the debates over section 4(2)'s 
requirements of "sophistication" and "access to information" had to 
think carefully about the role of these concepts in the Maryland exemp-
tion. Section 26(b )(9) thus amounted to a paradox: it was either too 
simple or too complex, depending upon who was reading it. This pro-
vision seemed to encourage noncompliance by the practitioner eager to 
rely on a fanciful, bright line twenty-five offeree or purchaser test, and 
it frustrated the conscientious attorney by dragging him into the morass 
of section 4(2) law. 
By the early 1970's, the Maryland policy of encouraging coordina-
tion of section 26(b )(9) and section 4(2) exemptions seemed to have 
created more problems than it had solved. The Division's awareness of 
this problem with federal coordination, when coupled with its percep-
tion of investor abuse under section 26(b)(9), III led to the 1972 adop-
tion of Rule S-7, 112 a safe harbor under the statutory exemption. 
The 1972 version of Rule S-7 was an attempt to define with preci-
sion the exemptive conditions necessary for investor protection. First, 
the rule made clear that investor sophistication was a condition of ex-
emption. l13 This represented an administrative codification of infor-
mal Division policy and a reflection of then current trends on the 
federal level. The only exception to this requirement was an exclusion 
from the sophistication requirement for certain "related persons."114 
Second, Rule S-7 reemphasized the distinction between offerees and 
purchasers. This was accomplished by distinguishing between transac-
tions with an aggregate offering price of $50,000 or more and those 
with an aggregate offering price of a lesser amount. 115 The offerings of 
less than $50,000 could include no more than twenty-five purchasers in 
Maryland, but with no limit on the number of offerees per se. 116 The 
110. See supra note 4S. 
Ill. See Release No. S, supra note 106, at 3-4; Notes & Comments, supra note 28, at 
280-8S. 
112. Maryland Securities Rule S-7 (1972), MD. ADMIN. CODE tit .. 02, § .02.03.07 (re-
scinded 1974) [hereinafter referred to as 1972 Rule S-7]; see Release No.5, supra 
note 106. The text of the 1972 version of Rule S-7 is contained in Notes & Com-
ments, supra note 28, at 286-88. That rule was substantially revised in 1974. See 
infra note 121. The designation "S-7" reflects a mode of codifying Maryland ad-
ministrative regulations that has since been abandoned. 
113. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07(b)(I)-(2) (1972) (rescinded 1974). 
114. Id. "Related persons" were defined in the rule to include "the officers and direc-
tors, or general and managing partners, of the issuer, their spouses, parents, broth-
ers, sisters, and children." Id. § .02.03.07(a)(S) (rescinded 1974). 
lIS. Id. § .02.03.07(b)(I)-(2) (rescinded 1974). 
116. A practical limit on the number of offerees, however, was the Rule's ban on "gen-
eral advertising." Id. § .02.03.07(b)(I) (rescinded 1974). In addition, institutional 
investors were excluded from the calculations of the numbers of offerees and pur-
chasers. Id. § .02.03.07(f) (rescinded 1974). With respect to a subsequent revision 
of this aspect of 1972 Rule S-7, see infra note 12S. 
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offerings involving $50,000 or more remained limited to twenty-five of-
jerees in Maryland. Third, the rule avoided the section 4(2) problem of 
determining whether the offerees had access to information by not re-
quiring access to information or any specific form of disclosure as a 
condition of the exemption. Fourth, the rule required a short notice 
filing with the Division after completion of the offering-a device in-
tended to help the Division detect abuses. I 17 
When viewed as a whole, the version of Rule S-7 adopted in 1972 
represented a liberalization of the exemptive concepts being developed 
under section 4(2). Rule S-7 permitted the issuer to disregard the 
number of offerees in smaller deals; it allowed the issuer to avoid the 
sophistication requirement in transactions with related persons; and it 
rejected the federal principle that access to information or specific dis-
closure should be a condition of the exemption. The functional rela-
tionship between the federal and state exemptions could thus be stated 
in the following terms: if the issuer complied with the more stringent 
requirements of the section 4(2) exemption, it would almost certainly 
qualify for exemption under Rule S-7, provided that it made the appro-
priate notice filing in a timely manner. If, however, the issuer struc-
tured the transaction to exploit one or more of the liberalized aspects of 
Rule S-7, the transaction might not qualify for the stricter section 4(2) 
exemption on the federal level. This anomaly thus created a snare for 
those practitioners not sensitive to the more restrictive requirements of 
federal law. 118 
The continued proliferation of section 4(2) decisional law and the 
SEC's adoption of Rule 146119 in 1974 caused the Division to adopt a 
new Rule S-7. The 1974 version, however, represented more than an 
updating. Its express application of the concept of "exemption by coor-
dination" reflected once again the basic principle defined by the Study 
Committee and currently being applied in the new Maryland exemp-
tive regulations. 120 
Exemption by coordination under the 1974 version of Rule S-7 
was a simple matter. The rule provided that any offering complying 
with the conditions of Rule 146 would be deemed in compliance with 
Rule S-7 upon receipt by the Division of the issuer's representation on. 
Form D-l that the issuer had complied with Rule 146. 121 This direct 
117. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07(a) (rescinded 1974). 
118. See authorities cited supra note 48 (with respect to the restrictiveness of section 
4(2». 
119. Securities Act Release No. 33-5487, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 2710 (Apr. 23, 
1974). 
120. See supra text accompanying notes 92-105; see also infra text accompanying notes 
147-67 (discussing two new state exemptions, MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 02, 
§ .02.04.09 and § .02.04.15, which allow federal-state coordination). 
121. Maryland Securities Rule S-7 (1974), MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07.H 
(rescinded 1983) [hereinafter referred to as 1974 Rule S-7]. For a comment on 
this coordinating device, see Coles, supra note 45, at 462; Notes & Comments, 
supra note 28, at 296-98. The promulgation of 1974 Rule S-7 followed two years 
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approach to the problem of coordinating state and federal exemptions 
represented a significant advantage for the issuer engaged in an inter-
state transaction under Rule 146. Issuer's counsel would not have to 
consider restructuring the transaction to comply with the more restric-
tive requirements of a Maryland exemption because there were no such 
restrictive requirements. Indeed, counsel would not even have to spend 
time reading the regulation to discover that there were no such require-
ments-the coordinating language was simple and clear. 
The 1974 version of Rule S-7 also went beyond coordination with 
Rule 146. The Division recognized that a transaction could be ex-
empted at the federal level under the statutory section 4(2) exemption 
rather than under the Rule 146 safe harbor, or as an intrastate offering 
under section 3(a)(1l) of the 1933 Act.122 Accordingly, Rule S-7 also 
provided an exemption used in connection with offerings exempted on 
those bases. 123 
This aspect of Rule S-7 can be characterized as a liberalized appli-
cation of some of the section 4(2) and Rule 146 concepts. For instance, 
the state exemption drew upon the familiar section 4(2) criteria of of-
feree sophistication,124 a thirty-five person limit on the number of pur-
chasers "in this state,"125 a restriction on resale,126 and limitations on 
the manner of offering.127 The exemption, however, was substantially 
less rigorous than these federal exemptions in three key respects. First, 
it did not impose as a condition any specific disclosure or access to 
information. 128 Second, it excepted related person offerees from the so-
phistication requirement. 129 Third, it permitted the issuer to exclude 
related persons from the calculation of thirty-five purchasers. 13o The 
only potential snare was the requirement that a timely notice be filed as 
of experimentation with amendment of 1972 Rule S-7. See Maryland Securities 
Act Release No. II (Aug. 10, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Release No. II] (this 
release is no longer published in the BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH), but is on file with 
the Division; the text of the release was published in the Daily Record. Daily 
Rec., Aug. 10, 1973, at 5, col. 4. 
122. See Maryland Securities Act Release No. 20, I BLUE SKY L. REp. (CCH) ~ 15,553, 
at 11,553-55 (Oct. 24, 1974). This Release was a joint release with the Delaware 
Securities Commissioner, whose office simultaneously adopted an identical ver-
sion of 1974 Rule S-7. 
123. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07 A-G (rescinded 1983). 
124. Id. § .02.03.07 D (rescinded 1983). 
125. Id. § .02.03.07 E (rescinded 1983). A 1973 amendment of 1972 Rule S-7 elimi-
nated the distinction between offerings of less than $50,000 (25 purchasers) and 
those of more than $50,000 (25 offerees), and replaced it with a single limitation to 
35 purchasers in Maryland. See Release No. II, supra note 121, at 3. This ap-
proach was carried over into 1974 Rule S-7. 
126. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit .. 02, § .02.03.07 F (rescinded 1983). 
127. Id. § .02.03.07 C (rescinded 1983). 
128. q. Rule I 46(e), 17 C.F.R. § 230. I 46(e) (rescinded 1982) (disclosure or access to 
information required as a condition of the exemption). 
129. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07 D (rescinded 1983). 
130. Id. § .02.03.07 E(2)(a)(v) (rescinded 1983). 
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a condition of the exemption. 131 Since this ministerial task might easily 
be overlooked, the filing requirement created some cause for concern. 
The concern, however, was not all that substantial. Rule S-7 was a safe 
harbor, a nonexclusive rule. An offering that failed to meet each of the 
specific requirements of the exemption could, in the appropriate case, 
fall-back on the statutory exemption. This statutory fall-back could be 
especially helpful when the only noncompliance was failure to make 
the notice filing in a timely fashion. 
Rule S-7 thus was an effective rule. It was a useful coordinating 
device for the many interstate transactions that proceeded under Rule 
146, and it also provided a practicable framework for transactions ex-
empted under section 3(a)(11). In addition, it posed no obstacle to the 
issuer's reliance on the statutory section 4(2) exemption, because an of-
fering that met the more stringent requirements of that federal exemp-
tion would almost certainly qualify for the less stringent Maryland 
exemption. The only problem in this regard was the same one associ-
ated with the 1972 version of Rule S-7: an issuer that took advantage of 
Rule S-7's exception of related persons from the sophistication require-
ment, or that failed to provide a disclosure document or access to infor-
mation, might have found the section 4(2) exemption unavailable. 
Although Rule S-7 was effective, developments in state and federal 
law eventually rendered it obsolete.132 By 1981, it had become appar-
ent that some modification was needed in the Maryland statutory ex-
emption. The need for amendment of section 11-602(9), as former 
section 26(b )(9) was designated after the 1975 recodification of the Act, 
derived from three problems. 
First, the adoption and widespread use of Rule S-7 created sub-
stantial disparities between the statutory exemption and the rule exemp-
tion. The disparities were of both a philosophical and a practical 
nature. The statute, for example, permitted no more than twenty-five 
offerees. Rule S-7, following Rule 146, permitted sales to thirty-five 
purchasers (excludin~ related persons), and placed no limit on the 
number of offerees. 13 This exercise of the commissioner's statutory au-
thority to "further condition this exemption, [and] increase or decrease 
the number or offerees permitted," 134 created an important inconsis-
tency between the statutory exemption and the rule exemption. Simi-
larly, the section 4(2) and Rule 146 ban on general solicitation and 
public advertising may have been implicit in the section 11-602(9) ex-
emption, but the statute made no express reference to it. Rule S-7, in 
contrast, explicitly stated the prohibition. 135 Rule S-7 thus reflected the 
131. Id. § .02.03.07 G (rescinded 1983). That filing was to be on Form D-l, or contain 
the information required by that form. Id. 
132. See supra text accompanying notes 39-80. 
133. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07 E (rescinded 1983). 
134. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(9) (1975) (amended 1981). 
135. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07 E (rescinded 1983). 
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exemptive concepts of the middle 1970's while the statute reflected 
those of 1962Y6 
Second, the availability of this partially inconsistent statutory ex-
emption outside of the Rule S-7 safe harbor generated both uncertainty 
and a threat to investor protection. The uncertainty arose from the pre-
viously discussed disparity between the conditions of the statutory ex-
emption and those of the rule exemption. The threat to investor 
protection was demonstrated most clearly in the 1979 decision by the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Hohensee v. State,137 a case 
that reflected a tendency to read the statutory exemption in a simplistic 
and misleading manner. 
In Hohensee, the court reversed a criminal conviction of an indi-
vidual who had allegedly violated the Act through employing an un-
registered agent. 138 The court found that because the defendant's offers 
in Maryland were exempt under section 11-602(9), there had been no 
need for the agent to register,139 and hence no criminal violation had 
occurred. The court's conclusion that the offers of sale were exempt 
was based solely on a finding that there were less than twenty-five of-
ferees in the state. 14O The court ignored the express statutory require-
ment conditioning the exemption upon the sellers' reasonable belief in 
the buyer's investment intent. In addition, the court failed to read sec-
tion 11-602(9) against the backdrop of section 4(2) law, Rule S-7, and 
informal Division policy, and did not consider the possibility that the 
exemption should depend upon the seller's demonstration that the of-
ferees (or even purchasers) met some kind of suitability criteria and 
that no general solicitation or public advertising had been used. 141 
The failure of the Hohensee court to apply all the statutory condi-
tions and to acknowledge section 4(2) and Rule S-7 as relevant sources 
of authority for interpretation of the exemption produces an inaccurate, 
reductionist reading of the statutory exemption. That reading, further-
more, undermined the Division's attempt to define a coherent and com-
prehensive exemption in Rule S-7. Rule S-7 attempted to balance the 
136. See supra text accompanying notes 102-05. 
137. 42 Md. App. 329,400 A.2d 455 (1979). 
138. Maryland law requires agent registration. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. 
§ 11-402 (1975). "Agent" means "an individual other than a broker-dealer who 
represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect the 
purchase or sale of securities." Id. § 11-IOI(b)(I). 
139. The court was able to reach this conclusion because the Act excludes from the 
definition of agent an individual who represents an issuer in effecting a transac-
tion exempt under section 11-602. Id. § ll-IOI(b)(3)(ii). 
140. Hohensee, 42 Md. App. at 339, 400 A.2d at 461. 
141. The court was apparently aware of the existence of Rule S-7. See id. at 335 n.17, 
400 A.2d at 459 n.17. The court's failure to read the exemption against the back-
drop of section 4(2) was especially perplexing in view of its quotation of the Study 
Committee's statement in the MARYLAND REPORT that "the Act roughly approxi-
mates locally the coverage of the two principal federal securities laws .... " Id. 
at 331, 400 A.2d at 457. 
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interests of capital formation and investor protection; it is unclear 
whether the Hohensee court was even aware of the need for this kind of 
balancing. The decision thus demonstrated the risks associated with an 
exemptive system divided between a detailed rule and a statute that 
might be read simplistically. 
Third, the Commissioner's adoption of the Rule S-7 exemption by 
coordination arguably could be supported by the Commissioner's stat-
utory authority to further condition the section 11-602(b )(9) exemp-
tion.142 The usefulness of the coordination device, however, suggested 
the need for specific statutory authority. A specific authorization 
would not only legitimize the Rule 146 coordination but also could be 
used as a basis for coordination with other important new federal rules, 
such as those being developed by the SEC under section 3(b) of the 
1933 Act. 
V. THE NEW MARYLAND EXEMPTIONS FOR LIMITED 
AND PRIVATE OFFERINGS: REGULATIONS 9 AND 
15 
A. First Steps: The 1981 Amendments to the Maryland Securities Act 
The former Commissioner of the Division, K. Houston Matney, 
responded to these problems with the Maryland exemptive system by 
proposing certain amendments to the Act in the 1981 session of the 
Maryland General Assembly. This legislation was enacted,143 resulting 
in the amendment of section 11-602(9) and adoption of a new section 
11-602(15).144 The current amended version of section 11-602(9) 
provides: 
To the extent the Commissioner by rule or order permits, 
any offer or sale in a transaction involving the sale by an is-
suer to not more than 35 persons, other than those designated 
in item (8) of this section, in this State during any period of 12 
consecutive months, whether or not the seller or any pur-
chaser is then present in this State, if the seller reasonably 
believes that all the purchasers in this State, other than those 
designated in item (H) of this section, are purchasing for in-
vestment, and if the securities have not been offered to the 
general public by advertisement or general solicitation but the 
Commissioner by rule or order, as to any security or transac-
tion or any type of security or transaction, may withdraw or 
further conditIOn this exemption, increase or decrease the 
number of purchasers permitted, or waive the condition relat-
ing to their investment intent. 145 
142. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(9) (1975) (amended 1981). 
143. 1981 Md. Laws 775 (codified at MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(a)(15) 
(Supp. 1984». 
144. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(15) (Supp. 1984). 
145. Id. § 11-602(9). 
1984) Offering Exemptions 523 
These changes require little explanation since they were directly 
responsive to the problems outlined in the previous section. The ten-
sion between inconsistent statutory and rule exemptions was eliminated 
by deleting the purely statutory exemption: a transaction can now be 
exempted under section 11-602(9) only "to the extent the Commis-
sioner by rule or order permits." Any rule implementing section 11-
602(9) thus would not be merely a safe harbor. Instead, it would be the 
exclusive means of gaining the exemption, save through exercise of the 
Commissioner's order power. Modernization was achieved by replac-
ing a reference to "twenty-five offerees" with a reference to "thirty-five 
purchasers," and by substituting "purchaser" or "purchasers" for "of-
ferees" throughout the section. The statute thus supplies the basis for a 
rule reflecting the modem trend toward purchaser rather than offeree 
regulation. Finally, the statute now expressly prohibits public advertis-
ing and general solicitation. 
New section 11-602(15) provides: 
To the extent permitted by rule or order of the Commis-
sioner, any offer or sale within this State by an issuer now or 
hereafter exempted from § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 by 
virtue of a rule or regulation adopted by the United States 
Securities and Exchange CommisslOn under § 3(b) or § 4(2) 
of that Act; if the issuer files with the Commissioner a notice 
of intent to claim exemption under this paragraph, at such 
time or times, in such form, and containing such mformation 
as the Commissioner determines. 146 
This exemption, like that under section 11-602(9), is not self-executing, 
but depends upon the Commissioner's exercise of administrative au-
thority. Accordingly, the 1981 legislation set the stage for a rulemaking 
project. 
B. The Ru/emaking Project: Defining Different Exemptions for 
Different Functions 
That rulemaking project commenced in the autumn of 1981 as a 
cooperative effort of a committee composed of representatives of the 
Division and the Securities Law Committee of the Section of Corpora-
tion, Banking, and Business Law of the Maryland State Bar Associa-
tion (the Rulemaking Committee). 147 Although the Rulemaking 
Committee's efforts were delayed by the SEC's proposal and ultimate 
adoption of Regulation D, it finally proposed new Regulations 9148 and 
146. Id. § 11-602(IS). 
147. The Rulemaking Committee consisted of former Commissioner K. Houston Mat-
ney and Assistant Attorney General Susan M. Rittenhouse, representing the Divi-
sion, and Theodore Kaplan, Edward E. Obstler and this author, representing the 
Securities Law Committee. 
148. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Reg. 9]. 
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15 149 as responses to changes in federal law. Regulation 15 was imple-
mented by administrative order on June 7, 1982,150 and both regula-
tions were formally published on April I, 1983. 151 The balance of this 
article will describe these regulations and will identify some potential 
problems with their application. In particular, this article will explain 
how these regulations represent the Rulemaking Committee's attempt 
to achieve three goals: (1) promotion of federal-state coordination; 
(2) modernization and simplification of the exemptions; and (3) reduc-
tion of compliance costs for small businesses attempting to raise capital 
through exempt transactions. 
The Rulemaking Committee's recognition of these three different 
although related goals led it to produce not one but two exemptive reg-
ulations. The committee produced two rules rather than one because it 
understood that one rule could not serve all of these goals with respect 
to all issuers and all offerings. Furthermore, the Rulemaking Commit-
tee felt compelled to design an exemptive system that would account 
for the changes effected by Regulation D. Regulations 9 and 15, there-
fore, were designed to have different, although complementary func-
tions within the exemptive scheme. Before turning to individual 
analysis of each of these exemptions, this subsection will provide a 
brief overview of how the Rulemaking Committee defined the different 
functions of these two rules. The key to this definition, perhaps, is a 
perception of what Regulation D did and did not do. 
Regulation D was desi~ned, in part, to make the federal exemptive 
scheme more systematic. 1 2 The attempt was generally successful, 
largely because Regulation D contains a common set of definitions and 
exemptive conditions, and because it makes the strictness of the exemp-
tion proportional to the aggregate offering price. The more money the 
issuer wants to raise, the more regulatory restraints will be applied; 
conversely, the less money, the fewer restraints. Despite all of its sys-
tematic qualities, Regulation D did not totally transform the federal 
exemptive system because Congress and the SEC allowed several im-
portant non-Regulation D exemptions to remain in existence after the 
149. Id. § .02.04.15 [hereinafter cited as Reg. IS); see Sargent & Matney, Bluer Skies in 
Maryland.' An Introduction to the New Maryland Exemptions for Limited and Pri-
vate Offerings of Securities, 14 U. BALT. L.F. 22 (Fall 1983) (reviewing Reg. 9 and 
Reg. IS); Sargent, Dealing with Maryland Blue Sky Reform: A Step-by-Step Case 
Study and Guide, Daily Rec., Sept. 28, 1983, at 4, col. 1. The Division has pub-
lished a brief explanatory release covering these regulations. Maryland Securities 
Act Release No. 24, lA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 30,566 (Dec. 15, 1983) [here-
inafter cited as Release No. 24). 
150. Order, In the Matter of Exemption by Coordination with SEC Rule 505 and 506, 
Maryland Securities Commissioner (June 7, 1982) (Copy on file at the Division). 
151. 10 Md. Admin. Reg. 55d1 (Mar. 18, 1983). 
152. Securities Act Release No. 6389, (1981-1982 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 83,106, at 84,908 (Mar. 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Release No. 6389); 
see also Parnell, Kohl & Huff, supra note 43, at 682 (Regulation D is "an inte-
grated and logically presented series of objective rules"). 
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adoption of the regulation. Notably, the statutory 4(2) exemption re-
mains available outside the Rule 506 safe harbor. 153 Similarly, an is-
suer may still rely on the section 3(a)(11)/Rule 147 intrastate offering 
exemption. In addition, the Regulation A and section 4(6) exemptions 
remain available. 154 As a result, the Rulemaking Committee was faced 
with the task of considering the appropriate state treatment of transac-
tions exempted at the federal level under the statutory 4(2) exemption, 
section 4(6), Rule 147, and Regulation A as well as under one of the 
three Regulation D exemptions. 
Regulation A and section 4(6) presented little difficulty for several 
reasons. First, Regulation A offerings could be registered by coordina-
tion in Maryland. 155 Second, the relatively insignificant section 4(6) 
exemption is primarily useful for smaller placements to institutional 
investors,156 which can be exempted under Maryland's statutory insti-
tutional offering exemption. 157 The statutory 4(2) and Rule 147 exemp-
tions, however, presented more challenging problems. These problems 
had to be resolved in tandem with the issue of defining a state approach 
to the different Regulation D exemptions. The Rulemaking Commit-
tee's resolution reflected its three interrelated goals of promoting fed-
eral-state coordination, modernizing and simplifying the state law, and 
reducing small business compliance costs. The net result was two new 
exemptive rules. 
Regulation 15 is the key to the system. It permits exemption by 
153. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 to .506 preliminary note 4; Release No. 6389, supra note 152, 
~ 83,106, at 84,910. 
154. When the SEC proposed Regulation D it announced its intent to consider the 
feasibility of eliminating Regulation A. Securities Act Release No. 6339, [1981-
1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 83,014, at 84,458 (Aug. 7, 1981) 
[hereinafter cited as Release No. 6339]. The response of the bar to this suggestion 
was decidedly negative. See Comment Letter of Members of the ABA Section of 
Corporation, Banking, and Business Law of the American Bar Association, at 15, 
SEC File No. S7-891 (Nov. II, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment Letter]. 
155. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-503(d) (1975). 
156. Since the SEC's 1982 publication ofa rule defining the term "accredited investor" 
for purposes of § 4(6) (17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (1983)), securities may be sold under 
§ 4(6) to natural persons. This has made § 4(6) more useful than before. Cf. L. 
Loss, supra note 76, at 348-49 (suggesting that § 4(6) has limited utility). Al-
though the exemption may still be largely redundant, it could be a useful alterna-
tive to Rule 505 in some circumstances because: (I) it does not require delivery of 
a disclosure document; (2) it contains no "bad boy" disqualifications; and (3) of-
ferings made during the prior 12 months under a section 3(b) exemption do not 
have to be aggregated for purposes of calculating the § 4(6) aggregate offering 
price. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 76, at xliv. If an issuer sells securities 
under § 4(6) to other than institutional investors, however, the state exemption for 
offers and sales solely to these investors will not be available. See MD. CORPS. & 
ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(8) (1975). In Maryland, the offering will have to be 
registered or meet the exemptive conditions of Reg. 9. In view of the liberal terms 
of the federal exemption, this seems to be an appropriate alternative at the state 
level. For a discussion of the development of § 4(6) and Rule 215, see Helman, 
The Sophisticated Accredited Investor, 14 REV. SEC. REG. 861 (1981). 
157. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(8) (Supp. 1984). 
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coordination with Rules 505 and 506. An offering made in compliance 
with Rule 505 or 506 will be exempt under section 11-602(15) of the 
Act provided a simple notice filing is made with the Division and two 
additional, but relatively minor, conditions are satisfied. 158 The crux of 
the state exemption, therefore, is compliance with the requirements of 
either Rule 505 or 506. Rules 505 and 506 are perhaps the most impor-
tant bases for interstate exempt offerings; exemption by coordination 
under Regulation 15 allows those offerings to proceed in Maryland 
without the need to restructure or restrict the offering except in rela-
tively minor ways.159 This promotion of federal-state coordination, 
moreover, is accomplished through a simple cross-reference. As a re-
158. See infra text accompanying notes 189-216. 
159. The Maryland device of exemption by coordination should be compared to the 
Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ULOE) adopted by NASAA. I BLUE SKY 
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (revised version adopted Sept. 21, 1983). Since 1981 
NASAA has been trying to develop an exemption for limited and private offerings 
that could be adopted on a uniform basis by its members. See Release No. 6339, 
supra note 154, ~ 83,014 at 84,458. The goal of the project was "to reduce the 
burdens on small issuers by eliminating in most instances the multiplicity of regu-
lations imposed at both the state and federal levels." Id. ULOE has gone through 
numerous drafts and has been the subject of criticism from within NASAA, see 
NASAA Memorandum, supra note 39, and without, see Halloran & Linderman, 
supra note 14, at 165-74. 
In comparison to Reg. IS, NASAA's current ULOE is a more tentative ap-
proach to exemption by coordination. The basic problem is that ULOE still con-
tains conditions reflecting regulatory concerns that the SEC has either rejected or 
deemphasized. For example, ULOE permits the payment of sales remuneration 
only to persons appropriately registered in the state. ULOE ~ LA., I BLUE SKY L. 
REp. (CCH) ~ 5294 (revised version adopted Sept. 21, 1983); if. ULOE ~ 1. Ann. 
2-3 (identifying certain options). The SEC proposed a similar restriction in its 
original version of Regulation 0, see Release No. 6339, supra note 154, but that 
restriction was dropped from the final version. Reg. 15 imposes a less stringent 
remuneration restriction than that set forth in ULOE. See MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
.02, § .02.04.15(B)(3) (1984). In addition, section D of ULOE requires the issuer 
to meet sophistication and risk-bearing suitability standards for all nonaccredited 
investors. It is noteworthy that an earlier version of ULOE contemplated addi-
tional individual suitability standards for the accredited investors as well. See 
NASAA Memorandum, supra note 39, at 7. In contrast, neither Rule 505 nor 
Reg. 15 impose any suitability standards on nonaccredited investors, and Rule 
506 does not require risk-bearing suitability for these investors. Furthermore, sec-
tion C of ULOE would permit a state to require either pre- or post-commence-
ment notice filing. ULOE ~ C n.4, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (revised 
version adopted Sept. 21, 1983). Both Regulation D and Reg. 15 require only 
post-commencement filing. Finally, ULOE contemplates coordination with only 
Rule 505 offerings. Although explanatory footnote I to ULOE suggests that "[i]n 
those states where facts and circumstances permit, it would not be inconsistent 
with the regulatory objectives of this exemption" to coordinate with Rule 506, 
ULOE itself does not permit this coordination. Furthermore, ULOE footnote 1 
contains language highly critical of the use of Rule 506 in connection with tax 
shelter investments. 
Reg. 15 represents a more direct approach to coordination since it: (1) ex-
pressly coordinates with Rule 506 as well as Rule 505; (2) imposes no additional 
suitability standards; and (3) requires only post-commencement notice filing. It 
adds to Rules 505 and 506 only through imposing a restriction on remuneration (a 
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suit, counsel need not read through a multipage rule to determine that 
a substantial degree of coordination is intended. The major benefit of 
coordination and simplification, finally, is reduction of compliance 
costs-a boon to all issuers, especially small business issuers, upon 
whose smaller offerings compliance costs fall with a disproportionately 
greater weight. 160 
The Rulemaking Committee recognized, however, that state ex-
emption by coordination would not be appropriate with respect to all 
federal exemptions. In particular, it recognized that the basis of the 
Rule 504 exemption was deferral to state regulation. Rule 504 repre-
sents a decision by the SEC to remove significant federal regulatory 
restraints from certain smaller offerings because those offerings are de 
minimis from the federal perspective, and because they could and 
would be regulated by the states. 161 The SEC contemplated that those 
offerings would be either state registered or subjected to a stricter state 
exemption; the SEC did not contemplate that Rule 504 would be the 
basis for a wholly coordinated state exemption. The Rulemaking Com-
mittee gave effect to the SEC's recommendation by extending Regula-
tion 15 exemption by coordination only to Rule 505 and 506 offerings, 
thereby recognizing that a state exemption for quasi-public offerings 
with an aggregate offering price of $500,000 to an unlimited number of 
offerees and purchasers without any kind of mandatory disclosure or 
suitability standards would seriously threaten Maryland investors. 
Similarly, the Rulemaking Committee decided that exemption by 
coordination would not work for Rule 147 and section 4(2) exemptions. 
The Rule 147 problem was similar to the Rule 504 problem; the basis 
for the intrastate offering exemption is deferral to state regulation, as 
the SEC made clear in its explanatory release accompanying Rule 
147.162 Exemption by coordination with Rule 147 made no sense con-
ceptually or as a matter of policy. 
The question of coordination with the statutory section 4(2) ex-
emption was different because that exemption does not represent a sim-
less stringent one than ULOE's) and some special "bad boy" disqualifications 
similar to those imposed by ULOE. See infra text accompanying notes 211-16. 
Therefore, it is perhaps fair to conclude that ULOE represents an important 
step toward interstate uniformity and federal-state coordination, but that Reg. 15 
represents a more complete realization of the principle of exemption by coordina-
tion. For a more detailed discussion of ULOE, see Keller, Uniform Limited Offer-
ing Exemption, in BLUE SKY LAWS: STATE REGULATION OF SECURITIES (J. 
Halperin & H. Makens eds. 1984). 
160. See Release No. 6389, supra note 152, ~ 83,106, at 84,908; SEC, SEC GOVERN-
MENT BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION 44-49 (Nov. 
1982) [hereinafter cited as SEC FORUM). 
161. Release No. 6389, supra note 152, ~ 83,106, at 84,909; Release No. 6339, supra 
note 154, ~ 83,014, at 84,458; see a/so Release No. 24, supra note 149, ~ 30,566, at 
25,581 (SEC deferred to the states for regulation of Rule 504 offerings). 
162. Securities Act Release No. 5450, I FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 2340, at 2611-12 
(Jan. 7, 1979). 
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pIe deferral to state regulation. The difficulties in coordinating with 
section 4(2) were more complex. Particularly troublesome was the elu-
siveness of the exemption. Because section 4(2) law is still a nonsys-
tematic combination of decisional law, administrative interpretation, 
and lawyers' rules of thumb, it is difficult to determine exactly when the 
statutory exemption exists. 163 Since one of the purposes of the 1981 
legislation was elimination of uncertainty and promotion of predict-
ability through administrative rule making, the elusive statutory exemp-
tion seemed to fit poorly with the coordinating device. Furthermore, 
the exemption still depends upon some outmoded concepts, notably of-
feree suitability and stringent disclosure requirements. 164 Accordingly, 
section 11-602(15) only permits coordination with a rule or regulation 
adopted under section 4(2). 
The question thus became what should be done at the state level 
with Rule 504, Rule 147, and section 4(2) offerings. The issuer could 
register those shares by qualification,165 but it seemed inappropriate to 
force all these offerings into registration. As an alternative, the 
Rulemaking Committee provided Regulation 9, which was designed 
for use with offerings under any of those three exemptions. It is a mold 
into which those offerings can be poured to qualify for a state exemp-
tion. Regulation 9 will be analyzed in detail below, but a few key 
points about its relationship with Regulation 15 and the federal exemp-
tions must be emphasized here. 
First, Regulation 9 is not a coordinating exemption. Its availabil-
ity does not depend upon qualification for some federal exemption. 
The issuer does not have to establish a Rule 504, Rule 147, section 4(2), 
or any other federal exemption to use it. It is simply available for use in 
connection with offerings federally exempted on anyone of those bases. 
Conversely, qualification under one of those federal exemptions does 
not automatically entitle the issuer to the Regulation 9 exemption; in-
stead, compliance with each of the conditions of Regulation 9 is re-
quired. Counsel thus should not regard Regulation 9's use of 
Regulation D terminology and concepts as implying "coordination" in 
the Regulation 15 meaning of that word. The Ru1emaking Committee 
borrowed terminology and concepts from Regulation D because some 
aspects of that regulation could be put to use in Regulation 9, and that 
is the only connection between those two regu1ations. 166 
Second, Regulation 9 was intended to be a simple exemption for 
use principally by small business. Although it will probably be used 
163. See Section 4(2) and Statutory Law, supra note 104, at 486, 489. 
164. See Nimkin, supra note 78, at 865-67. 
165. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-504 (1975). 
166. The use of Regulation D terminology and concepts in Reg. 9 makes SEC interpre-
tation of Regulation D relevant to Division interpretation of Reg. 9. Those inter-
pretations, however, are merely relevant, because nothing in Reg. 9 makes them 
automatically binding on the Division. Accordingly, they will become binding 
only if the Division adopts them as such. 
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most often in connection with Rule 504 offerings,167 it is available to 
other issuers and is not exclusively a mechanism for small business cap-
ital formation. 
Third, although Regulation 9 implements the section 11-602(9) ex-
emption, it is not merely a safe harbor. It is the exclusive means of 
gaining that exemption, except through order of the Commissioner. 
The relationship of Regulation 9 and section 11-602(9) thus does not 
parallel the relationship of Rule 506 and section 4(2). 
In sum, Regulations 9 and 15 have different functions. Regulation 
15 is a coordinating device that permits Rule 505 and 506 transactions 
to proceed in Maryland without incurring substantial additional com-
pliance costs. Regulation 9 is not a coordinating device as such, but is 
designed for use in connection with federally exempted offerings that 
can meet its specific conditions. It was intended to be especially useful 
for Rule 504 offerings that the issuer does not wish to register in Mary-
land. Because it is a relatively simple exemption, small business should 
find it to be an inexpensive means of raising capital in Maryland. If 
counsel is sensitive to the different functions of these two regulations, 
the choice of exemption in Maryland should be easy to make. 
C Regulation 15: Exemption by Coordination 
1. Incorporation by Reference of Federal Law 
Regulation 15, on its surface, is simple. Section A states the ex-
emption: "Offers and sales of securities that satisfy the conditions and 
limitations in [section] B of this regulation shall be exempt under Cor-
porations and Associations Article, [section] 11-602(15)."168 The cru-
cial substantive provisions of Regulation 15 are located in section B. 
Subsection B(I) sets out the coordinating device. The offer or sale must 
be "part of an offering which is made in compliance with Rule 505 or 
506 (17 C.F.R. Parts 230.505 or 506, incorporated herein by reference) 
as such rules may be amended from time to time."169 
Crucial to this exemption is the reference to Rules 505 and 506 as 
they currently exist and as they may be amended in the future. This 
device should permit substantial coordination between the federal and 
state exemptions. Indeed, the basis of the state exemption is establish-
ment of the federal exemption. This premise is also expressed in sub-
section B(2), which characterizes the issuer's mandatory filing of the 
SEC Form D as "the issuer's representation and affirmation to the Di-
167. While Reg. 9 was not adopted on a uniform basis with any other state, it still 
provides a form of exemption useful in connection with a Rule 504 offering. It is 
thus a step toward the recommendation stated in November 1982 by the SEC 
Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation. See SEC 
FORUM, supra note 160, at 60-61. 
168. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.15A (1984). 
169. Id. § .02.04. 15B(l). 
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vision that it has complied with SEC Rule 505 or 506."170 
It must be emphasized, however, that the express incorporation by 
reference of Rules 505 and 506 means that those rules themselves are 
technically part of Maryland law. If that is the case, the Division may 
be entitled to interpret Rules 505 and 506 for purposes of Regulation 15 
in a manner different from the SEC or the federal courts. The practical 
problem created is the risk that an issuer could establish a Rule 505 or 
506 exemption for purposes of federal law but then be denied a Regu-
lation 15 exemption because the Division interprets Rule 505 or 506 
more restrictively. Because Regulation 15 expressly makes those rules 
part of state law, inconsistent state interpretations of Rules 505 and 506 
as state law are possible. 
Although this theoretical possibility is created by the language of 
incorporation by reference, and although it may give the Division some 
useful flexibility in responding to sudden or questionable changes in 
SEC interpretation, it seems wholly inconsistent with the basic purpose 
of Regulation 15. That purpose is to make the state exemption hinge 
upon: (I) the establishment ofthe/ederalexemption under federal law; 
and (2) the issuer's satisfaction of the three additional conditions spe-
cifically stated within the rule. The whole purpose of "exemption by 
coordination" is elimination of duplicative or unnecessarily inconsis-
tent state regulation in the context of certain exempt transactions; the 
purpose is not the creation of state variants of Rules 505 or 506. 171 The 
creation of these state variants would be especially troublesome if their 
character could be determined only from no-action letters, orders pur-
suant to administrative hearings, or more informal policy statements. 
Although the Division will probably exhibit its traditional restraint in 
this regard, it may be appropriate to amend Regulation 15 by deleting 
the phrase "incorporated herein by reference" from subsection B(l). If 
that is done, it will be more clear that the state exemption depends 
upon establishment of the federal exemption under federal law. 
2. The Problem of Delegation 
Regulation 15's coordination of the state exemption with the fed-
eral exemption also generates the more serious problem of delegation. 
That problem arises because subsection B(I) refers to Rules 505 and 
506 as they "may be amended from time to time." In essence, state law 
170. Id. § .02.04.15B(2). 
171. It is noteworthy that neither the Rulemaking Committee's drafts nor the Divi-
sion's proposed version of Regulation 15B(1) contained the words "incorporated 
herein by reference." The language was added by the Division apparently in re-
sponse to concerns of the Division of State Documents about potential delegation 
problems. See Letter of Dennis M. Sweeney, Assistant Attorney General, to Rob-
ert J. Colborn, Division of State Documents (Jan. 17, 1983) [hereinafter cited as 
Sweeney Letter). As the discussion below will show, because there should be no 
delegation problem under Reg. 15, the "incorporated herein by reference" lan-
guage is superfluous. See infra text accompanying notes 172-88. 
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has been tied to future federal law; if Regulation D is amended by the 
SEC, the basis for exemption under state law will change. There is 
some risk that this could be regarded as an unconstitutional delegation 
of state authority to the SEC, because the delegation doctrine has been 
interpreted to mean that the state law cannot be pegged to "changes in 
the federal laws or regulations to occur in the future."172 
The main problem here is not with section 11-602(15), Regulation 
15's enabling statute, despite that section's exemption of transactions 
"now or hereafter" 173 exempted under section 4(2) or 3(b) of the 1933 
Act. This reliance on future federal law, while questionable, is not nec-
essarily invalid on delegation grounds because it will occur only to the 
extent the Commissioner by rule or order permits. The statute contem-
plates that the state agency, and not the federal government, will ulti-
mately determine the effect of changes in federal law on the state 
exemption. Section 11-602(15) thus should be considered valid under 
State v. Ciccarelli, a case decided by the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland in 1983.174 The Ciccarelli court rejected a delegation chal-
lenge to a Maryland statute that classified as "controlled dangerous 
substances" materials that had been so designated by federal authori-
ties and to which no objection was made by the Maryland Department 
of Health and Mental Hygiene. 175 The court specifically rejected the 
defendant's contention that this section allowed the federal agency to 
create state law. 176 
The court held first that the statutory reservation of a thirty day 
period in which the state agency could decide whether to object to the 
state classification of the federally designated substance meant that "[i]t 
is the state agency, not the federal one, that makes the final determina-
tion."177 Section 11-602(15) even more clearly relies on state adminis-
trative action; a federal rule under sections 4(2) and 3(b) will become 
the basis for a state exemption only if the Commissioner affirmatively 
acts. The Commissioner's mere failure to object will not trigger coordi-
nation with the new federal rule. 
The Cicarelli court then held that the statute in question was valid 
because it would "guide and restrain" the agency's exercise of discre-
172. Lee v. State, 635 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Mont. 1981); e.g., State v. Williams, 119 Ariz. 
595,583 P.2d 251 (1978); State v. Johnson, 84 S.D. 556, 173 N.W.2d 894 (1970); 
People v. DeSilva, 32 Mich. App. 707, 189 N.W.2d 362 (1971); Homer's Market, 
Inc. v. Tri-County Metropolitan Transp. Dist., 21 Or. App. 288, 467 P.2d 671, 
aJFd, 256 Or. 124,471 P.2d 798 (1970); Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wash. 2d 286,347 P.2d 
1081 (1959). 
173. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(15) (Supp. 1984). 
174. State v. Ciccarelli, 55 Md. App. 150,461 A.2d 550 (1983); Mason v. State, 12 Md. 
App. 655,280 A.2d 753, cerl. denied, 263 Md. 717 (1971). 
175. Ciccarelli, 55 Md. App. at 154,461 A.2d at 553. 
176. Id. at 154,461 A.2d at 553. 
177. Id. at 156,461 A.2d at 554. The court expressly approved a similar decision by 
the Supreme Court of Missouri in State v. Thompson, 627 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1982). 
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tion. l78 It would do so because it stated specific criteria for the agency 
to consider when it decides whether to object to inclusion on the state 
schedule of a federally designated substance. 179 In contrast, section 11-
602(15) does not state specific criteria for the Commissioner to consider 
when deciding whether to effect coordination with federal law. A strict 
application of Ciccarellis "guide and restrain" concept might make 
section 11-602(15) questionable. It is possible to defend section 11-
602(15), however, on the ground that the legislative history of the entire 
Act makes clear that the fundamental policy of the statute is to ensure 
maximum coordination of state and federal securities regulation while 
continuing to protect Maryland investors. This approach to blue sky 
law is clearly expressed in the Study Committee's Report, which ex-
plains how the Act can help prevent certain specified abuses while fol-
lowing SEC disclosure policy rather than the Uniform Act's merit 
approach, by allowing Regulation A offerings to be registered by coor-
dination, and by making the state private offering exemption more con-
sistent with the federal exemption. 180 Because a court may look to 
legislative history to determine whether the legislature has performed 
the essential function "of determining basic legislative policy and for-
mulating a rule of conduct,"181 the requisite legislative guidance for 
and restraint on administrative action under section 11-602(15) may 
exist. For these reasons, section 11-602(15) is probably not defective on 
delegation grounds. 
Regulation l5's implementation of section 11-602(15), however, 
presents a more complicated issue. Subsection B(l) of Regulation 15 
makes clear that an amended Rule 505 or 506 will still be the basis for 
a Regulation 15 exemption. There is no requirement that the Commis-
sioner evaluate the changed federal law to determine whether it should 
continue to serve as a basis for coordination. Similarly, the regulation 
contains no proviso that amended versions of the federal rules will 
serve as a basis for the exemption unless the Commissioner objects 
thereto, nor any reference to a waiting period after which the amended 
federal law will become applicable unless the Commissioner objects. 
The continued coordination with future amended versions of Rules 505 
and 506 is practically automatic. 
Because Ciccarelli requires the state agency and not the federal 
agency to make the final determination, the regulation implementing 
section 11-602(15) may have delegated an unconstitutional quantum of 
authority to the SEC. If Regulation 15 makes the Division a "rubber 
stamp" with respect to changes in Rules 505 and 506, it is vulnerable 
178. Ciccarelli, 55 Md. App. at 156,461 A.2d at 554 (citing Mason v. State, 12 Md. 
App. 655, 675-76, 280 A.2d 753,766, cerl. denied, 263 Md. 717 (1971)). 
179. Ciccarelli, 55 Md. App. at 155-56,461 A.2d at 554. 
180. See supra text accompanying notes 92-103. 
181. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971). 
1984) Offering Exemptions 533 
under Cicarelli's application of the delegation doctrine. I82 
Although the regulation may be vulnerable, it is not necessarily 
invalid. If prospective application of future amended versions of Rules 
505 and 506 is deemed an impermissible delegation, the court may 
sever the offending provision and thereby prohibit coordination with 
the future versions of Rules 505 and 506 while permitting cordination 
with the version in effect at the time of publication. 183 
Furthermore, Regulation 15 is merely an administrative rule. If 
Rules 505 or 506 are amended in a manner that would make exemption 
by coordination inappropriate, the Division can revise the regulation . 
. Legislative action would be unnecessary, as it would be if Regulation 
15 were a statute. Because the Division can respond to changes in fed-
erallaw more rapidly and efficiently than the General Assembly, the 
degree of actual delegation to the SEC is proportionately less than it 
would be if section 11-602(15) were a self-executing statutory exemp-
tion that did not require administrative implementation by rulemaking. 
Finally, substantial considerations of public policy may make rigid 
adherence to the delegation doctrine both unnecessary and counter-
productive. 184 As Congress,185 the SEC,186 and state securities adminis-
trators l87 have recognized, inconsistent federal-state regulation of 
limited and private offerings may impose an unnecessary restraint on 
capital formation. The restraint results from three interrelated 
problems: (1) the compliance costs generated by the need to identify 
and understand additional or different state exemptive requirements; 
(2) the compliance costs produced by the delays incident to multistate 
blue sky compliance; and (3) the burden of restructuring a transaction 
eligible for a federal exemption to qualify for a more restrictive or at 
least different state exemption. The exemption by coordination device 
is intended to reduce these restraints by promoting consistency in ex-
emptive policies and techniques. Exemption by coordination will be 
more effective, however, if the Division permits virtually automatic co-
ordination with amended versions of Rules 505 and 506. If this coordi-
182. See Ciccarelli, 55 Md. App. at 158 n.4, 461 A.2d at 555 n.4. The Ciccarelli court 
distinguished State v. Rodriquez, 397 So. 2d 1084 (La. 1980), in which the stricken 
statute had provided that the secretary of the appropriate state agency shall add 
any substance to the controlled list if the federal Drug Enforcement Agency clas-
sified it as controlled. In Rodriquez, "[tJhe secretary of the state agency was but a 
'rubber stamp', divested of any discretion in the matter." Ciccarelli, 55 Md. App. 
at 158,461 A.2d at 555. 
183. See People v. DeSilva, 32 Mich. App. 707, 189 N.W.2d 362 (1971). 
184. For an argument that the delegation doctrine should not be applied in a rigid 
manner, and that state adoption of future federal law should be considered in 
light of the substantive regulatory policies at issue in the area subject to concur-
rent state and federal regulation, see Rochvarg, State Adoption of Federal Law-
Legislative Abdication or Reasoned Policymaking?, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 277 (1984). 
185. See Securities Act of 1933 § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c) (1982). 
186. See Release No. 6339, supra note 154, ~ 83,014; SEC FORUM, supra note 160, at 
55-61. 
187. See NASAA ULOE (1983), I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5294 (Sept. 21, 1983). 
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nation is not permitted, serious disparities between state and federal 
law may develop. 188 
The prevention of a time lag between federal and state changes 
will prevent temporary (and not so temporary) interference with the 
efficient functioning of the coordination device. It will also simplify the 
administrative task. The Commissioner will not have to carry out the 
rulemaking process every time the SEC amends Regulation D so as to 
update Regulation 15. That process will need to be initiated only if the 
Commissioner wants to further condition the coordination exemption 
because of changes in federal law. Neither Regulation 15 nor section 
Il-602( 15) would prevent the Commissioner from exercising discretion 
in that regard. 
In addition, automatic coordination with amended versions of the 
federal rules is not an abdication of the Division's responsibility to pro-
tect Maryland investors. The federal rules in question will be revised 
by an agency with both substantial expertise and a traditional concern 
for the needs of investors. If automatic coordination can reduce the 
compliance costs associated with inconsistent state regulation without 
undermining the Division's ability to protect Maryland investors, then 
the delegation problem should not prove fatal. 
The major interpretative and policy problems with Regulation 15 
are thus created by subsection B(I). A summary of the rest of the ex-
emption, however, will reveal a few other notable issues. 
3. The Filing Requirement: A Trap for the Unwary? 
Subsection B(2) requires the issuer to file with the Division "not 
later than 15 days after the first sale of securities under this regulation, 
a manually signed notice on completed SEC Form D ... together with 
a $100 check."189 There are two points to note about this apparently 
innocuous notice filing provision. First, the filing must be made not 
. later than fifteen days after the first sale of securities "under this regula-
tion." Sales "under this regulation" are, obviously, the sales made in 
Maryland. Because this filing is a requirement of Maryland law, the 
Division is not bound by SEC interpretations of when a sale occurs 
188. The Division recognized this possibility in one of its internal documents: 
Experience has indicated that regulations and forms change at the fed-
eral level more frequently and with greater speed than such changes at 
the state level. The time lag which would result from forcing the State to 
continually play "catch-up-ball" with regard to state regulations in-
tended to fully coordinate with regard to certain federal regulations is 
likely to result only in diminished confidence in, and compliance with, 
the state regulatory structure. In such a case there could be no assurance 
that the state regulations have not been caught in a "time-warp" in its 
efforts to keep pace with changes at the federal level. 
Sweeney Letter, supra note 171, at 3. 
189. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.15B(2) (1984). 
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under Regulation D.190 The Division thus could develop a more or less 
restrictive definition of when the first sale occurs. 
Second, the notice filing requirement is a condition of the exemp-
tion. Failure to satisfy this simple requirement in a timely fashion can 
result in loss of the exemption, just as a failure to file Form D with the 
SEC can result in loss of the Regulation D exemption. 191 This severe 
penalty arguably must exist if the Division is to be able to monitor all 
Regulation 15 transactions for misuse of the exemption. It is question-
able, however, whether the issuer should incur this kind of penalty192 
for failure to make a notice filing or failure to make it in a timely fash-
ion. Regulation 15's filing requirement is easier to comply with than 
Regulation D'S193 because the Maryland rule requires only one filing, 
but the use of the filing as a condition of the exemption perhaps needs 
reexamination. In any event, issuer's counsel should keep well aware 
of this simple, but stringent requirement. 
4. Restrictions on Remuneration 
Subsection B(2) imposes an additional filing requirement to that 
imposed by Regulation D. Subsection B(3), however, imposes a condi-
tion foreign to Regulation D-a restriction on the persons the issuer 
may remunerate for their sales efforts.194 Specifically, a Rule 505 or 
506 offering may be exempted in Maryland under Regulation 15 only if 
any sales remuneration is paid exclusively to the persons designated in 
subsections B(3)(a)-(b). This restriction on remuneration represents 
not only an additional state requirement superimposed on the federal 
requirements of Rules 505 and 506, but also a departure from Rule S-7, 
which never imposed any restrictions on remuneration. Subsection 
B(3) provides that remuneration for selling efforts may be paid only to 
a broker-dealer that the issuer reasonably believes is registered in 
Maryland, or: 
(b) To a natural person who the issuer reasonably believes 
has not received a commission or similar remuneratIOn for ef-
190. The SEC has issued a set of interpretations of when the Form D should be filed. 
See Securities Act Release No. 6455, I FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) ~ 2380, at 2637-
17 (questions 82-84) (Mar. 3, 1983). The Division currently follows the SEC in 
consldering the "first sale" to occur "when the subscription agreement is delivered 
to the issuer or its representative or when a purchaser's check is delivered to the 
issuer or its representative, whichever occurs first." Release No. 24, supra note 
149, ~ 30,566, at 25,583-84. 
191. Release No. 6339, supra note 154, ~ 83,014. 
192. See Kripke, supra note 78, at 851; Schneider, supra note 78, at 988. 
193. Rule 503 requires the issuer to file a notice of sale on Form D not later than 15 
days after the first sale, every six months thereafter, and no later than 30 days 
after the last sale. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a)(I)-(3) (1983). 
194. The proposed version of Regulation D contained a restriction on remuneration. 
See Release No. 6339, supra note 154, ~ 83,014, at 84,464-65. The restriction was 
deleted from the final version. See Release No. 6389, supra note 152, ~ 83,106, at 
84,910. 
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fecting any sale of securities on behalf of more than one other 
issuer within a 12-month period immediately precedins the 
first sale by that person in the offering being made in rehance 
on this regulation. 195 
It should be emphasized that this restriction applies not only to 
classic brokers' sales commissions, but also to more unconventional ar-
rangements. This approach reflects current blue sky decisional law, 
which has tended to give a broad reading to state restrictions on remu-
neration. 196 Subsection B(3), however, is still a relatively mild restric-
tion on remuneration. Other states go much further and will either 
absolutely prohibit remuneration,197 or will allow it to be paid only to 
state registered broker-dealers. 198 
As subsections B(2)(a)-(b) demonstrate, there are two categories of 
persons to whom remuneration can be paid. The first category consists 
of broker-dealers whom the issuer reasonably believes are registered 
under the Act. The reasonable belief qualification could be important. 
If a broker-dealer's registration is revoked during the course of the of-
fering and before the broker-dealer stops offering and selling the secur-
ities, the qualification might prevent loss of the exemption. 199 
The second category essentially consists of issuers' agents who 
have not slipped over the line into the status of unregistered broker-
dealers. This concept needs some explanation. Section 11-
IOI(c)(2)(i)2°O of the Act states that the term "broker-dealer" does not 
include an "agent. " Under section 11-10 I (b)( I), "agent" means "an in-
dividua other than a broker-dealer who represents an issuer in effect-
ing or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities."201 The 
statute goes on, however, to exclude froni the definition of agent "an 
individual who represents an issuer in: . . . (ii) effecting transactions 
exempted by section 11_602."202 This sequence of definitions and ex-
19S. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.ISB(3) (1984). 
196. See, e.g., Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, SS2 S.W.2d 4 (1977) 
(excess profits on sale or lease to partnership constitute remuneration); Caldwell v. 
Trans-Gulf Petroleum Corp., 322 So. 2d 171 (La. 1975) (fees paid to finders con-
stitute remuneration); Prince v. Heritage Oil Co., 109 Mich. App. 189,311 N.W.2d 
741 (1981) (retention of an interest in a partnership or a well at reduced or no 
consideration constitutes remuneration); Petroleum Resources Dev. Corp. v. Day, 
S8S P.2d 346 (Okla. 1978) (remuneration present even if sales commissions are 
subsequently disallowed by issuer or promoter). 
197. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 203(d)(iii) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984); PA. AD-
MIN. CODE § 203.041(g), reprinted in 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 48,43S, at 
43,S09 (May II, 1974). 
198. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 4SI.802(b)(9)(C) (West Supp. 1983-1984). 
199. This does not intimate, however, that the issuer can avoid establishing a reason-
able belief in the broker-dealer's registered status bifore it authorizes the broker-
dealer to commence the offering. The Division, however, has not specifically de-
fined the steps appropriate for the establishment of reasonable belief. 
200. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § I 1-101 (c)(2)(i) (197S). 
201. Id. § ll-lOl(b)(I). 
202. Id. § I 1-10 I (b)(3)(ii). 
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clusions has suggested the following misconceived argument. 
A natural person may represent numerous issuers during a rela-
tively short period of time in the placement of securities exempted 
under sections 11-602(9) or 11-602(15). That person, according to this 
argument, is excluded from broker-dealer status because he is an is-
suer's agent, and also excluded from statutory agent status because he 
is engaged only in transactions exempt under section 11-602. Exclusion 
from each status would mean that this person is subject to neither bro-
ker-dealer nor agent registration. 
The Division has correctly refused to countenance this argument. 
In a 1974 release discussing the applicability of the broker-dealer regis-
tration provisions to transactions in limited partnership interests, the 
Division stated that "persons who solicit limited partnership interests 
on a private basis are by statute not considered [statutory] agents al-
though they occupy the traditional common law agency position. 
Hence such persons may not claim entitlement to the agent exclusion 
from the definition of broker-dealer set forth in [section] 11-
101(b)(l)."203 These persons may be broker-dealers under section 11-
101(c)(1) if they are "engaged in the business of effecting transactions 
in securities for the account of others .... "204 The Division clarified 
the consequences of this position by stating in that same release that 
any person: 
whether he be a true statutory agent or a common law agent 
who represents an issuer in a [section] 11-602(9) private trans-
action, is subject to a presumption that he is a broker-dealer if 
he solicits limited partnership interests for and on behalf of 
three or more issuers within a twelve month period. 205 
In short, the representation of the third issuer in a twelve month 
period creates the presumption that the person is engaged in the busi-
ness of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others. 
Subsection B(3)(b) is merely a new application of this presumption in a 
different context. It has the effect of prohibiting the Regulation 15 is-
suer from remunerating persons who are presumably unregistered bro-
ker-dealers selling in violation of the Act. 
Because subsection B(3) imposes an exemptive condition foreign 
to both Regulation D and Rule S-7, it raises a question as to whether 
this form of exemptive condition is appropriate. At the outset, it is im-
portant to note that the restriction is not all that severe. Although sub-
section B(3) employs a broad definition of remuneration, it is not an 
absolute prohibition of remuneration or a statement that only regis-
tered persons may be remunerated. The issuer will thus be able to 
203. Maryland Securities Act Release No. 18, lA BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 30,560, 
at 25,573 (May lO, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Release No. 18). 
204. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § ll-lOl(c)(l) (1975). 
205. Release No. 18, supra note 203, ~ 30,560, at 25,573. 
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compensate its own personnel for their sales efforts without losing the 
exemption. Similarly, the issuer will be able to retain personnel to en-
gage in the sales effort, and will be able to compensate an accountant or 
a lawyer for services in connection with the offering. The issuer need 
only establish a reasonable belief that those persons have not been sim-
ilarly compensated by more than one other issuer in the relevant time 
period. 
Subsection B(3) thus will not have the negative effects of an abso-
lute prohibition or a limitation to registered persons-interference with 
the issuer's ability to market sound securities, and encouragement of 
less scrupulous issuers to compensate unregistered persons in a covert 
or unconventional manner.206 In addition, it may produce a degree of 
investor protection by encouraging the use of registered securities pro-
fessionals who are subject to supervision by the Division,207 who must 
make determinations as to the suitability of the investment for their 
206. In a comment letter, the ABA stated: 
We strongly oppose Rule 502(e) which makes the limited offering ex-
emptions unavailable if any remuneration is given for solicitations or in 
connection with sales to persons other than broker-dealers registered 
under federal and state laws. While we recognize that many states pro-
hibit the payment of remuneration in exempt limited offerings, we be-
lieve it is counterproductive for the Commission, which has been 
charged by Congress to diminish the burdens of raising capital for small 
business, to impose additional federal requirements in areas where none 
previously existed in its regulations. Accordingly, we recommend that 
Rule 502(e) be eliminated in its entirety. Issuers would be free to remu-
nerate third parties in Regulation D offerings-whether they be broker-
dealers, business finders, business brokers, or promoters, officers, direc-
tors, employees or shareholders of the issuer, or others. 
We believe that the proposed restriction on remuneration would 
have the following undesirable consequences: 
(I) One effect of the proposal is to grant a monopoly in the exempt 
limited offering ~arket to registered broker-dealers, a result we assume 
was unintended. --We believe any such result is certainly unjustified. 
Broker-dealers play an integral role in capital raising efforts as do pro-
moters, business finders, business brokers (particularly in the context of 
business combinations) and other persons who are compensated for their 
solicitation efforts. Many, if not most, of those persons are neither regis-
tered nor required to be registered as broker-dealers under federal and 
state law. 
(2) It is not uncommon for small businesses seeking to raise capi-
tal to be unable to attract or afford registered broker-dealers. However, 
since proposed Rule 502(e) prohibits the payment of compensation to 
persons other than registered broker-dealers, another effect of the propo-
sal is to force small businesses that wish to remunerate such persons to 
register their offerings or abandon them. 
(3) Another effect of the proposal is to cause persons who are com-
pensated for solicitation or sales to register as broker-dealers even 
though the nature of their activities in many circumstances does not sub-
ject them to registration under present federal and state law. We also 
assume that this result was unintended. 
ABA Comment Letter, supra note 154, at 42. 
207. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-401 to -417 (1975). 
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customers, and who have fiduciary obligations to them?08 These per-
sons thus may help police the transaction. Similarly, the limitations 
may reinforce Regulation D's ban on general advertising and solicita-
tion.209 Furthermore, subsection B(3)(b) may have the effect of exclud-
ing from the sales effort persons who have demonstrated a lack of 
concern with securities law compliance. 
Subsection B(3) is thus a relatively mild restriction on remunera-
tion that may help protect investors. A few questions, however, re-
main. First, it is unclear whether restrictions on remuneration actually 
protect investors, because we do not know whether the persons who 
may be compensated under section B(3) will actually "police the deal." 
The SEC has not resolved this question, and it dropped from the final 
version of Regulation D the restriction on remuneration that had ap-
peared in the proposed version.210 Second, how may the issuer estab-
lish reasonable belief that nonregistered agents have not represented 
more than one other issuer within the relevant time period? What level 
of due diligence on the part of the issuer is required? Is a questionnaire 
sufficient, or will the issuer have to undertake some more rigorous in-
quiry? Finally, is it appropriate to use an issuer exemption to enforce 
indirectly the broker-dealer registration requirement? In essence, 
should the issuer bear the risk ofthe remunerated persons' non-compli-
ance with that requirement? The restrictions on remuneration thus 
raise questions of efficacy (do they really protect investors?), practical-
ity (how can reasonable belief as to compensability be established?), 
and policy (who should bear the risk of violation of the broker-dealer 
registration requirement?). A period of experimentation may produce 
some insight into the efficacy and practicability of these restrictions. If 
it is determined that these restrictions are in fact practicable and pro-
vide a measure of investor protection, then it may be possible to decide 
as a matter of policy that the issuer should bear some of the risk of 
broker-dealer registration violations by the persons it has compensated. 
5. "Bad Boy" Disqualifications 
Subsection B(4) also produces some important questions. That 
provision sets out a series of so-called "bad boy" disqualifications.21l 
208. See No. 6339, supra note 154, ~ 83,014, at 84,464-65. 
209. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1983). 
210. See Release No. 6339, supra note 154, ~ 83,014, at 84,464-65. 
211. Regulation 15 provides: 
An exemption under this regulation is not available if the issuer, 
any of its directors, officers, general partners, or beneficial owners of 10 
percent or more of any class of its equity securities, any of its promoters 
currently connected with it in any capacity, or any person (other than a 
broker-dealer currently registered under Corporations and Associations 
Article, § 11-405) which has been or will be paid or given, directly or 
indirectly, any commission or similar remuneration for solicitation of 
any prospective purchaser or in connection with sales of securities in 
reliance on this regulation: 
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In effect, it denies the exemption if the issuer, or any of its directors, 
officers, general partners, beneficial owners of ten percent or more of 
any class of the issuer's equity securities, promoters currently con-
nected with the issuer in any capacity, or nonregistered recipients of 
remuneration has been subject to specified judicial or administrative 
actions within five years prior to the first sale of securities under Sub-
section B( 4). All of the specified actions concern discipline for acts of a 
fraudulent or deceitful nature. Two key points need to be made about 
this condition. 
First, it causes bad boy disqualifications to apply to Rule 506 offer-
ings in Maryland. Rule 506 itself contains no such disqualifications; 
Rule 505 is the only one of the three Regulation D exemptions that 
contains bad boy provisions.212 
Second, the subsection B(4) disqualifications are somewhat 
broader than the Rule 505 disqualifications. In particular, subsection 
B(4) disqualifies the issuer when the specified persons have been con-
victed or are currently subjected to judicial restraint for false filings 
with a state securities administrator, or are subject to a state adminis-
trative order entered by a state securities administrator in which fraud 
or deceit was found. In short, subsection B(4) will disqualify an issuer 
if a court or a state administrator has found that one of the specified 
persons violated some state's securities law through a false filing or the 
commission of fraud or deceit. The SEC's original version of Rule 505 
had contained similar state bad boy disqualifications,213 but they were 
(a) Has been convicted or has pleaded nolo contendere within 5 years 
prior to the first sale in any offering in reliance on this regulation of any 
felony or misdemeanor in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security or in connection with the making of any false filing with the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission or any state securi-
ties administrator, or of any felony involving fraud, or deceit, including 
but not limited to, forgery, embezzlement, obtaining money under false 
pretenses, larceny, conspiracy to defraud, or theft; 
(b) Is subject to any order, judgment, or decree of any court of compe-
tent jUrisdiction temporarily or preliminarily restraining or enjoining, or 
is subject to any order, judgment or decree of any court of competent 
jurisdiction, entered within 5 years prior to the first sale in any offering 
in reliance on this regulation, permanently restraining or enjoining that 
person from engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice in con-
nection with the making of any false filing with the United States Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission or any state securities administrator; 
(c) Is subject to a United States Postal Service false representation or-
der entered within 5 years prior to the first sale in any offering in reliance 
on this regulation; or 
(d) Is subject to any state administrative order entered by a state secur-
ities administrator in which fraud or deceit was found if the order was 
entered within 5 years prior to the first sale in any offering in reliance on 
this regulation. 
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit .. 02, § .02.04. 15B(4)(a)-(d) (1984). 
212. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(iii) (1983). 
213. Release No. 6339, supra note 154, ~ 83,014, at 84,468. 
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dropped from the adopted version.214 In essence, subsection B(4) rein-
states, for purposes of transactions in Maryland, disqualifications very 
similar to those dropped by the SEC. 
The imposition of bad boy disqualifications on Rule 506 transac-
tions in Maryland and the engrafting of additional state disqualifica-
tions on Rule 505 transactions can best be described as a form of 
indirect regulation. Instead of strictly limiting the number and nature 
of the offerees and purchasers, Regulation 15 tries to keep the transac-
tions honest by excluding from participation those persons with a rec-
ord of securities law noncompliance. Regulation 15, however, arguably 
should not have added state disqualifications to Rule 505 transactions 
or applied any to Rule 506 transactions. The addition of these disqual-
ifications may be viewed as inconsistent with the principle of exemp-
tion by coordination.2ls This argument is plausible, but not 
compelling. State securities administrators are often engaged in en-
forcement actions in which the SEC may play no role and about which 
the federal agency may not even know. The crucial track record of 
fraud or deceit may exist only at the state level. It thus may be reason-
able to require the issuer to extend its due diligence inquiry to the state 
administrations as well as to the SEC and the courts. 
In any event, the potential harshness of subsection B(4) may be 
mitigated by subsection B(5), which provides that "[d]isqualification 
under B( 4) does not apply to any transaction if the Commissioner de-
termines that it is not inconsistent with the public interest that the ex-
emption be available."216 
D. Regulation 9: A Noncoordinating Exemption 
Regulation 9 was designed for use with transactions exempted on 
some basis other than Rules 505 or 506. A summary of the regulation 
will show how it is a flexible device adaptable to use in connection with 
most Rule 504, Rule 147, and section 4(2) transactions.2 17 
214. Release No. 6389, supra note 152, ~ 83,106, at 84,910. 
215. The disqualification on the basis of a state administrative order may be especially 
problematic in view of the state administrator's authority to issue cease and desist 
orders. See, e.g., MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § I 1-70 1 (a)(4) (Supp. 1984); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 lOA, § 407A (West 1984). These very flexible en-
forcement tools may be exercised by the state administrator on an ex parte basis. 
See Economou v. Wade, 515 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Iowa 1980). 
216. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.158(5) (1984). That subsection continues: 
"This determination by the Commissioner shall be without prejudice to the Com-
missioner in any other proceeding or matter with respect to the issuer or any other 
person." 
One possible effect of the imposition of subsection 8(4)'s disqualifications on 
Rule 506 transactions might be the occasional registration by qualification of 
those offerings in Maryland. If one of the general partners in a limited partner-
ship syndication, for example, is a firm with large numbers of officers or general 
partners, registration in Maryland may be less time consuming than a due dili-
gence survey of disciplinary records. 
217. Of course, there may be problems with meeting both the federal and state exemp-
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As previously explained, Regulation 9 does not truly coordinate 
with Regulation D.2l Its structure and terminology, however, reflect 
the influence of that set of rules. This should not be a source of confu-
sion. The borrowings from Regulation D are merely an acknowledge-
ment of some of the useful aspects of that regulation; the availability of 
the Regulation 9 exemption does not depend upon establishment of a 
Regulation D exemption, and the establishment of a Regulation D ex-
emption does not entitle the issuer to a Regulation 9 exemption.2l9 
Regulation 9 actually consists of two separate exemptions: the Lo-
cal Issuer Exemption and the General Transactional Exemption. The 
Local Issuer Exemption provides a very simple exemption for certain 
local small business issuers, and the General Transactional Exemption 
provides a somewhat more complex exemption for a broader class of 
issuers. The rest of Regulation 9 sets out definitions and conditions 
common to both exemptions. Since those definitions and conditions 
apply throughout the Regulation, they should be examined first. 
1. Definitions 
Section A of Regulation 9,220 like Rule 501 of Regulation D,221 
sets forth definitions applicable throughout the regulation. Section B222 
functions similarly to Rule 502,223 defining conditions applicable to all 
transactions to be exempted under the regulation. Regulation 9's no-
tions in all cases. Regulation 9 is intentionally more restrictive than Rule 504. 
See supra text accompanying note 161. An issuer who wishes to take full advan-
tage of Rule 504's liberality thus may want to register by qualification in Mary-
land. State registration, of course, would allow the issuer to offer the Rule 504 
securities through general solicitation and public advertising, and without restric-
tions on resale. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(I) (1983). 
Regulation 9 also imposes exemptive conditions that are not necessarily more 
restrictive than those of Rule 147, but are quite different. They are different be-
cause they focus on the limited and private character of the offering rather than its 
intrastate character. The issuer seeking both exemptions must therefore be able to 
place the intrastate offering into a limited and private offering mold. Ordinarily, 
that should not be very difficult. For a useful discussion of some of the complexi-
ties of the intrastate offering exemption, see Long, A Lawyer's Guide to the Intra-
State Exemption and Rule 147,24 DRAKE L. REV. 471 (1975). 
The problem is reversed for statutory section 4(2) transactions. By aban-
doning offeree suitability requirements, deemphasizing the role of mandatory dis-
closure, and adopting the accredited investor concept, Regulation 9 created an 
exemption considerably more liberal than that of statutory section 4(2). Thus, an 
offering that takes full advantage of Regulation 9 may not be able to qualify 
under section 4(2). This was, however, a potential problem under Rule S-7 as 
well, see supra text accompanying notes 131-32, and never seemed to generate 
great concern. This lack of concern perhaps reflects the tendency of issuers to 
ensure federal compliance before worrying about blue sky compliance. 
218. See supra text accompanying notes 165-67. 
219. Id. 
220. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A (1984). 
221. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (1983). 
222. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit .. 02, § .02.04.09B (1984). 
223. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (1983). 
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tice filing requirement, however, is stated within section B,224 rather 
than stated separately in an equivalent to Regulation D's Rule 503.225 
Sections C and D of Regulation 9 are roughly parallel to Rules 504-
506; they concisely define the exemptions to which the preceding defi-
nitions and conditions apply. Section E has no analogue in Regulation 
D, because it merely declares the unavailability of the exemption for 
offerings registered under the 1933 Act or exempted under Regulation 
A, Rule 505, or Rule 506. There is also no Regulation D equivalent to 
Form MD-2, a disclosure document specifically designed for use with 
some Regulation 9 offerings. The structural affinities between Regula-
tion 9 and Regulation D are thus substantial, but it must be reempha-
sized that this is a state exemption that must be established as a matter 
of state law.226 
Section A begins with a definition of "accredited investor."227 As 
explained below, the question of whether a person is an accredited in-
vestor is relevant to the calculation of the number of purchasers al-
lowed under the exemption,228 the determination of the issuer's 
disclosure responsibilities,229 and the definition of "local issuer. "230 
Since the definitions of accredited investor set forth in subsections 
A(1)(a)-(h) are practically identical to those contained in Rule 501(a), 
no extended summary and discussion of the different categories of ac-
credited investor is needed.231 It is necessary, however, to identify cer-
tain key differences in the state and federal definitions. 
Subsection A(l)(d) tracks Rule 501(a)(4) in defining as an accred-
ited investor "[a]ny director, executive officer, or general partner of the 
issuer of the securities being offered or sold, or any director, executive 
officer, or general partner of a general partner of that issuer .... "232 
Subsection A(l)(d), however, goes on to broaden this category of ac-
credited investor by including "any relative, spouse, or relative of the 
spouse of any such individual specified in this paragraph who has the 
224. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § 02.04.09B(7) (1984). 
225. 17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (1983). 
226. Of course, although SEC and federal court interpretations of similar language in 
Regulation D may be relevant in interpreting Regulation 9, those interpretations 
are not binding on the Division or the Maryland courts. 
227. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A(I) (1984). 
228. See infra text accompanying notes 283-87. 
229. See infra text accompanying notes 316-29. 
230. See infra text accompanying notes 295-300. 
231. The SEC has recently stated its position on some interpretive problems with the 
definition of accredited investor. See Securities Act Release No. 6455, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 231.6455 (Mar. 3, 1983) (questions 1-31). Recent SEC No-action Letters on ac-
credited investor questions include: Smith, Barney, Upham, Harris & Co., [1982-
1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 77,340 (July 14, 1982); Lola M. 
Hale, Esq., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 77,339 (July 
I, 1982); Winthrop Fin. Co., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 
77,235 (June 25, 1982). 
232. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(4) (1983); MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A(I)(a) 
(1984). 
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same principal residence as that individual."233 Similarly, Rule 
501(a)(7) defines as an accredited investor "[a]ny natural person who 
had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most 
recent years and who reasonably expects an income in excess of 
$200,000 in the current year."234 Subsection A(I)(t) adds after the 
words "individual income" the phrase "or an income combined with 
the income ofthat person's spouse."235 Subsections A(l)(t) and A(I)(d) 
represent modest attempts to broaden two of the important categories 
of accredited investors.236 
The definition of accredited investor is followed by definitions of 
"affiliate,"237 and "aggregate offering price,"238 both of which parallel 
equivalent provisions in Rule 501 of Regulation D.239 Subsection A(4) 
defines "beneficial owner" of a security to mean "any person with the 
power to vote or direct the disposition of the security."240 This defini-
tion plays a role in subsection A(6)'s definition of "local issuer."241 The 
definition of "local issuer" is the key to section C's Local Issuer Exemp-
tion, because only local issuers may use that exemption.242 The defini-
tion of local issuer follows subsection A(5)'s definition of "executive 
officer"243-a definition tracking Rule 501(t).244 
Subsection A(7) provides a broad definition of "promoter."245 It 
233. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A(1)(d) (1984). 
234. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(7). 
235. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A(1)(f) (1984). 
236. It may be appropriate in general to broaden the concept of accredited investor. 
One way to do so might be by defining sophisticated investors as accredited, al-
though this definition might be inconsistent with the other aspects of the definition 
of accredited investor, all of which depend upon objective standards. At least one 
commentator, however, has argued that this definition makes sense: 
[M]y objection is to the fact that the definition of accredited investor 
does not include a purchaser who specifically meets the stringent test of 
rule 506 of being able, either alone or with one or more purchaser repre-
sentatives, to have "such knowledge and experience in financial and 
business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of 
the prospective investment." Such a person can fend for himself. A sale 
to him is "one of those transactions where there is no practical need for 
[the bill's] application or where the public benefits are too remote." 
Kripke, supra note 78, at 836 (footnotes omitted). 
237. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit .. 02, § .02.04.09A(2) (1984). 
238. Id § .02.04.09A(3). 
239. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(b)-(c) (1983). 
240. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A(4) (1984). 
241. Id § .02.04.09A(6); see infra text accompanying notes 295-300. 
242. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit .. 02, § .02.04.09C (1984); see infra text accompanying notes 
295-303. 
243. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A(5) (1984). 
244. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(f) (1983). 
245. Regulation 9 states: 
"Promoter" means: 
(a) Any person who, acting alone or in conjunction with one or more 
persons, directly or indirectly takes the initiative in founding and 
organizing the business or enterprise of an issuer; or 
(b) Any person who, in connection with the founding or organization 
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encompasses both shareholders246 and non-shareholders.247 This defi-
nition plays a key role in the bad boy disqualifications set forth in 
subsection B(9)248 and the subsection D(3)(b)(i)249 "cheap stock" dis-
closure provisions of the General Transactional Exemption.250 Subsec-
tion A(8) is an elaborate definition of "purchaser representative."251 
Like Rule 50I(h) of Regulation D, subsection A(8) is designed to pre-
vent conflicts of interest among the issuer, the purchaser, and the pur-
chaser representative,252 and to ensure that the purchaser 
representative actually has the ability to evaluate the investment.253 
The definition of purchaser representative ends with an "Agency Note" 
advising the purchaser representative to consider the applicability of 
the state and federal antifraud, broker-dealer, and investment adviser 
provisions.254 The concept of purchaser representative plays only a 
limited role in Regulation 9; a purchaser representative can be used to 
establish purchaser suitability for purposes of the disclosure require-
ments of the General Transactional Exemption under subsection 
D(3)(a)(iii)(bb).255 
2. Conditions 
Section B lists nine conditions applicable to all transactions to be 
of the business or enterprise of an issuer, directly or indirectly re-
ceives in consideration of services or property, or both services and 
property, 10 percent or more of any class of securities of the issuer 
or 10 percent or more of the proceeds from the sale of any class of 
securities. However, a person who receives those securities or pro-
ceeds either solely as brokerage commissions or solely in considera-
tion of property will not be deemed a promoter within the meaning 
of this paragraph if the person does not otherwise take part in 
founding and organizing the enterprise. 
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A(7) (1984). 
246. Id. § .02.04.09A(7)(b). 
247. Id. § .02.04.09A(7)(a). 
248. Id. § .02.04.09B(9). 
249. Id. § .02.04.090(3)(b)(i). 
250. Id. § .02.04.090. 
251. Id. § .02.04.09A(8). 
252. See id. § .02.04.09A(8)(a) (prohibiting reliance on a purchaser representative 
connected with the issuer, except under specified circumstances); id. 
§ .02.04.09A(8)(c) (mandating disclosure to investor of potential conflicts of 
interest). 
253. See id. § .02.04.09A(8)(b) (requiring purchaser representative to be able to evalu-
ate the risks and merits of the investment). 
254. The "Agency Note" states: 
A person acting as a purchaser representative should consider the ap-
plicability of the broker-dealer registration and anti-fraud provision of 
the Maryland Securities Act and of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
and the applicability of the Maryland Securities Act, Corporations and 
Associations Article, § 11-302 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
to investment advisers. 
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09A(8) (1984). 
255. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.090(3)(a)(iii)(bb) (1984). 
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exempted under Regulation 9. Subsection B(l)(a)256 states the issuer's 
basic option: compliance with either section C's Local Issuer Exemp-
tion or section D's General Transactional Exemption. The issuer must, 
however, comply with all the conditions of subsection B, whichever op-
tion it follows. Subsection B(l)(a) also makes clear that "[t]he burden 
of proving an exemption under the regulation is on the person claiming 
the exemption."257 Subsection B(l)(b) mitigates the potentially harsh 
effect of Regulation 9's status as an exclusive rule and not a safe har-
bor.258 It does so by allowing an issuer to obtain an exemptive order 
from the Commissioner by showing "[t]hat the transaction demon-
strates substantial compliance in good faith with the conditions of the 
regulation,"259 and "that the order would not be inconsistent with the 
public interest."260 The key point is that the issuer who cannot satisfy 
all of the regulation's requirements has the burden of persuading the 
Commissioner that an exemption would still be appropriate. The stan-
dards governing the Commissioner's issuance of that order are broadly 
stated, and permit a flexible response to different financing needs. This 
kind of flexibility will be needed if the order mechanism is to function 
as a release from the burden of the regulation's exclusivity. Although 
subsection B(l )(b) is flexible, the issuer must still demonstrate "sub-
stantial compliance in good faith."261 
Subsection B(2)262 applies the familiar concept of integration263 to 
Regulation 9 transactions. The language of subsection B(2) is derived 
from Rule 502(a), and provides similar six month safe harbors for of-
fers and sales made more than six months before the commencement of 
an offering under Regulation 9 and six months after completion of the 
256. Id. § .02.04.098(1)(a). 
257. This language reflects MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-604 (1975): "In any 
proceeding under this title, the burden of proving an exemption . . . is on the 
person claiming it." The constitutionality of a similar provision in the Michigan 
statute was sustained in People v. Dempster, 396 Mich. 700, 713-14, 242 N.W.2d 
381, 388-89 (1976). For a discussion of Dempster, see MICHIGAN SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 9.09G (c. Moscow & H. Makens eds. 1983). There is no parallel 
case in Maryland. Cf. Hohensee v. State, 42 Md. App. 329, 339 n.19, 400 A.2d 
455,460 n.19 (1979) (dictum) (suggesting that there may be a constitutional prob-
lem with section 11-604) (citing Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 
(1975), ajf'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976». 
258. In contrast, MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602 (1975) and 1974 Rule S-7 
had a safe harbor relationship. See supra text accompanying notes 133-46. 
259. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit .. 02, § .02.04.098(l)(b)(i) (1984). 
260. Id. § .02.04.098(1)(b)(ii). 
261. Only experience with the Division's implementation of this provision will demon-
strate the stringentness of this requirement. 
262. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.098(2) (1984). 
263. For discussion of the integration concept, see Deaktor, Integration of Securities 
Offerings, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 465 (1979); Integration of Partnership Offerings: A 
Proposalfor Identifying a Discrete Offering, 37 8us. LAW. 1591 (1982) (position 
paper of A8A Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts, and Unincorporated As-
sociations [hereinafter cited as Integration]; Shapiro & Sachs, Integration Under 
the Securities Act: Once an Exemption, Not Always, 31 MD. L. REV. 3 (1971). 
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offering.264 Subsection B(2) further states that offers and sales made 
within those six month periods, "depending on the particular facts and 
circumstances, may be deemed to be 'integrated' with the offering." 
The subsection does not indicate what "facts and circumstances" would 
determine the question. The Division traditionally has taken a flexible 
approach to this question and can be expected to draw upon the five 
factor analysis applied by the SEC under section 4(2) and Regulation 
D.265 
Integration issues apparently have not created great concern in 
Maryland, but the topic recently received considerable national atten-
tion as a result of SEC v. Murphy,266 a 1980 decision by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In Murphy, a corporate 
promoter sold limited partnership interests in about thirty separate 
cable television partnerships to approximately four hundred inves-
tors.267 The court disregarded the limited partnerships' status as nomi-
nal issuers of the securities, integrated the offerings, characterized the 
corporate promoter as the "issuer," and held that no section 4(2) ex-
emption was available for the integrated offering.268 Murphy has led to 
a serious attempt to define a safe harbor for discrete offerings by lim-
ited partnerships with affiliated sponsors;269 it may be appropriate for 
264. The six month safe harbors apply if: 
During those 6 month periods there are no offers or sales of securi-
ties by or for the issuer that are of the same or similar class as those 
offered or sold under this regulation, other than those offers or sales of 
securities under an employee benefit plan of the type referred to in Cor-
porations and Associations Article, § 11-601(11) (1975). 
MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09B(2) (1984). 
265. In its "Note" to 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (1983), the SEC states: 
The following factors should be considered in determining whether 
offers and sales should be integrated for purposes of the exemptions 
under Regulation D: 
(a) Whether the sales are part of a single plan of financing; 
(b) Whether the sales involve issuance of the same class of 
securities; 
(c) Whether the sales have been made at or about the same time; 
(d) Whether the same type of consideration is received; and 
(e) Whether the sales are made for the same general purpose. 
Id. This five factor analysis derived from Securities Act Release No. 4552, (1962) 
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~~ 2770-2782, at 2918-21 (Nov. 6, 1962). In 1979, the 
SEC staff announced that it would no longer issue no-action letters on integration 
questions. Clover Fin. Corp., [1979 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 
82,091 (Apr. 5, 1979). 
266. 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980). 
267. Id. at 637. 
268. Id. at 642-44. 
269. The attempt was made by the ABA Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts, and 
Unincorporated Associations of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee 
in a position paper, Integration, supra note 263. Oregon has recently adopted the 
ABA proposal as an integration safe harbor for limited partnership offerings. OR. 
ADMIN. R., 815-36-015(3), reprinted in 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 47,634C (Oct. 
10, 1982). Oklahoma, in contrast, has expressly adopted the Murphy analysis. See 
"Opinion Letter-Limited Partnership-Integration of Offerings," 2 BLUE SKY L. 
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the Division to consider adopting a formal position on this issue.27o 
Subsection B(3) prohibits "any form of general solicitation or ad-
vertising."27I This provision basically tracks Rule 502(c),272 and re-
flects one of the requirements of section 11-602(9).273 Rule S-7 
contained a similar prohibition.274 Subsection B(4) imposes a restric-
tion on remuneration paid for solicitation or for sales.275 Because the 
language follows that of Regulation 15.B(3),276 some of the policy ques-
tions that arose in that context arise here as well. 277 
Subsection B(5) provides that "[s]ecurities acquired in a transac-
tion cannot be resold without registration under the Maryland Securi-
ties Act or an exemption therefrom."278 In addition, this provision 
requires the issuer to "exercise reasonable care to assure that the pur-
chasers of the securities in any offering under this regulation are 
purchasing for investment and not with a view to distribution of the 
securities."279 This characterization of securities exempted under Reg-
ulation 9 as restricted securities is derived from section 4(2), Rule 146, 
and Regulation 0.280 It also reflects the Division's longstanding policy 
toward secondary distributions of nonregistered securities.281 Subsec-
tion B(5) concludes by listing some of the standard techniques by 
which the issuer can exercise reasonable care in establishing investment 
intent. 282 
Both the Limited Offering and General Transactional Exemptions 
limit the number of purchasers to whom the exempted securities may 
be sold.283 Subsection B(6) provides a method of calculating the 
REP. (CCH) ~ 46,646 (Mar. I, 1982). For an Oklahoma court decision following 
the Murphy analysis at the urging of the Oklahoma Securities Commissioner, see 
State of Oklahoma ex reI. Marley v. Derdeyn, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] BLUE 
SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 71,742 (D. Okla. 1982). 
270. For a sharp critique on the integration doctrine as it has been applied under sec-
tion 4(2) and Regulation D, see Kripke, supra note 78, at 839-43. 
271. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09B(3) (1984). 
272. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1983). 
273. MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602(9) (Supp. 1984) ("if the securities 
have not been offered to the general public by advertisement or general 
solicitation"). 
274. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07C (rescinded 1983). 
275. Id. § .02.04.09B(4) (1984). 
276. Id. § .02.04.15B(3). 
277. See supra text accompanying notes 194-210. 
278. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09B(5) (1984). 
279. Id. 
280. See 17 C.P.R. § 230.502(d) (1983), which describes Regulation D securities as 
having the status of restricted securities acquired in a transaction under section 
4(2). 
281. See Release No.5, supra note 106, at 4, 7. 
282. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09B(5)(a)-(d) (1984) (reasonable inquiry as to 
purpose of acquisition, restrictive legending, issuance of stop transfer instructions, 
and obtaining investment letter). The subsection does not make these the exclu-
sive means of establishing the requisite due diligence. 
283. See infra text accompanying notes 301-09. 
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number of purchasers that excludes from the total certain purchasers. 
Most notable is the exclusion for accredited investors.284 Also notewor-
thy is the exclusion of "[a]ny relative, spouse, or relative of the spouse 
of a purchaser who has the same principal residence as the pur-
chaser."285 Similar to that exclusion are exclusions for trusts, estates, 
corporations, partnerships, and other entities controlled by a pur-
chaser.286 In addition, subsection B(6)(b) states that a corporation, 
partnership, or other entity shall be counted as one purchaser, provided 
that the entity is not organized for the sftecific purpose of acquiring the 
securities offered under the exemption. 87 
Regulation 9's notice filing requirement is contained in subsection 
B(7).288 The filing requirement does not apply to all Regulation 9 of-
ferings; instead, it is triggered only when the aggregate offering price 
exceeds $100,000.289 If that figure is exceeded, the issuer must make a 
notice filing with the Division not later than fifteen days after the first 
sale of securities under the regulation. The issuer must file either a 
Form MD_1290 or a document containing the information required by 
this form, together with a filing fee. Form MD-l is a short, fill-in-the 
blank form containing eighteen items. These items require identifica-
tion of the issuer and its business; description of the securities being 
offered and the manner of the offering; identification of the issuer's of-
ficers, directors, general partner, trustees, beneficial owners, and sales 
representatives; and a listing of facts which may create a bad boy dis-
qualification. The timely filing of Form MD-l, like the timely filing of 
Form D under Regulation 15,291 is a condition of the exemption; the 
policy questions about Regulation IS's filing requirement are thus per-
tinent here as well. 
Subsection B(8) makes a standard disclaimer: exemption from re-
gistration under Regulation 9 does not provide an exemption from the 
Act's antifraud provisions.292 Exemption from securities registration is 
284. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit .. 02, § .02.04.09B(6)(a)(iv) (1984). 
285. Id. § .02.04.09B(6)(a)(i). 
286. Id. § .02.04.09B(6)(a)(ii)-(iii). 
287. Id. § .02.04.09B(6)(b). 
288. Id. § .02.04.09B(7). 
289. For the definition of aggregate offering price, see id. § .02.04.09A(3). 
The Division has taken the position that sales both within and without Mary-
land must be included in the aggregate offering price. Thus, if the entire offering 
exceeds $100,000 a filing must be made in Maryland, even if the aggregate price of 
the securities offered in Maryland is less than $100,000. Release No. 24, supra 
note 149, at 25,582 (Reg. 09, question 3). Release No. 24 also addresses the defini-
tion of aggregate offering'price. Id. (Reg. 09, question 7). 
290. Copies of Form MD-l may be obtained from the Division. This filing require-
ment would not be satisfied through filing the federal Form D used in connection 
with a Rule 504 transaction since Form D does not contain all of the information 
required by Form MD-1. See Release No. 24, supra note 149, at 25,582 (Reg. 09, 
question I). 
291. See MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.15B(2) (1984). 
292. Id. § .02.04.09B(8). 
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not an exemption from securities regulation. Subsection B(9) enumer-
ates certain bad boy disqualifications.293 This subsection is identical to 
Regulation 15.B(4), and serves the same purpose.294 
3. The Exemptions 
a. The Local Issuer Exemption 
Much of the substance of Regulation 9, like that of Regulation D, 
can be found in the statements of definitions and conditions. The sec-
tions defining the exemptions themselves are relatively succinct. Sec-
tion C's Local Issuer Exemption contains only four short subsections 
imposing conditions additional to those already imposed by section B. 
The Rulemaking Committee intended to make section C brief and sim-
ple because the Local Issuer Exemption was designed to be a practi-
cally self-executing exemption for the small business issuer. It was felt 
that these issuers should be able to raise a limited amount of capital 
without having to qualify the purchasers, deliver a disclosure docu-
ment, or make a notice filing. This reduction of regulatory restraint 
and compliance costs would, presumably, ease the small business is-
suer's difficulties with capital formation. 
The two-fold task before the Rulemaking Committee, therefore, 
was definition of the type of issuer that needed this kind of exemption 
and limitation on the size of the offering eligible for this liberal exemp-
tion. The solutions proposed by the Rulemaking Committee and 
adopted by the Division were essentially ad hoc, and should be re-
garded as experimenta1. This is an area in which rigorous empirical 
analysis of the capital needs and costs of Maryland's small business 
issuers may be needed. In any event, the Rulemaking Committee's so-
lutions were expressed in the Local Issuer Exemption of section C. 
Subsection C(1) defines the type of small business issuer that may 
use the exemption.295 That subsection provides that exemption under 
section C shall be available only to "local issuers," which is defined in 
subsection A(6). First, the issuer must be a corporation.296 Second, the 
corporation must be either organized in Maryland or qualified to do 
business in Maryland, and in both cases have its principal place of 
business in Maryland.297 Third, the issuer must reasonably believe that 
its securities are held by not more than fifty beneficial owners, both 
immediatelis before and immediately after any sale in reliance on this 
exemption. 98 These criteria reflect the Rulemaking Committee's belief 
293. Id. § .02.04.09B(9). 
294. See supra text accompanying notes 211-16. 
295. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09C(1) (1984). 
296. Id. § .02.04.09A(6)(a). 
297. Id. § .02.04.09A(6)(a)(i). 
298. Id. § .02.04.09A(6)(a)(ii); see also id. § .02.04.09A(6)(b)(i-iii) (explaining how to 
calculate the number of beneficial owners). The latter provision allows related 
persons, certain institutional investors, and any holder of a purchase money mort-
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that the small, local, corporate enterprise is the type of issuer that needs 
this form of regulatory relief and will not pose a significant threat of 
abuse.299 
The exclusion of limited partnerships from eligibility does not cre-
ate a significant disadvantage for those issuers. Most major limited 
partnership syndications will proceed under Rules 505 and 506, and 
thus will be exempted by coordination under Regulation 15. Others 
may be exempted under Regulation 9's more stringent General Trans-
actional Exemption. Although the exclusion does not seriously disad-
vantage the limited partnership issuer, it may provide a measure of 
investor protection, because some state administrators have identified 
some limited partnership syndications as particularly abusive.3°O 
Subsections C(2) and (3) shift the focus from the issuer to the of-
fering. Subsection C(2) requires that the issuer "reasonably believe 
that there are no more than 10 purchasers, wherever located, of securi-
ties from the issuer, in any twelve month period, in any offering pursu-
ant to this section."301 Although the 10 purchaser limitation may, at 
first glance appear to be too low, that appearance should be dispelled 
by recognition of two key facts. First, the issuer may use the General 
Transactional Exemption or Regulation 15 for larger offerings. Sec-
ond, subsection C(2) expressly mandates that the ten purchaser limit be 
calculated in accordance with subsection B(6). In sum, related persons, 
controlled entities, and accredited investors do not have to be counted 
toward the ten purchaser limit. Because subsection A(I)'s definition of 
accredited investors includes, among others, certain insiders and 
wealthy investors, the number of investors can swell considerably be-
yond ten. In effect, the Local Issuer Exemption puts a tight ceiling on 
the number of ''widows and orphans" to whom the issuer can sell. This 
would seem to be an appropriate limitation for this broad exemption, 
and it should not pose a great problem for the type of closely held 
enterprise for which this exemption was designed. Consistent with this 
approach is the $100,000 ceiling on the aggregate offering price estab-
lished by subsection C(3).302 An issuer with greater capital needs 
should be able to use the General Transactional Exemption. 
The self-executing character of the Local Issuer Exemption is 
brought into sharp relief by subsection C( 4), which states simply: 
gage to be excluded from the total, and permits corporations and certain other 
entities to be counted as single beneficial owners. 
299. The limitation to 50 beneficial owners does not reflect any scientific judgment as 
to the identity of the "true" small business issuer. A number on the high side was 
recommended by the Rulemaking Committee to give the issuer some flexibility to 
grow through successive offerings under the Local Issuer Exemption during the 
first few years of operation. 
300. See NASAA Memorandum, supra note 39, at 2-3, 7. 
301. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09C(2) (1984). 
302. Id. § .02.04.09C(3): "The aggregate offering price for an offering of securities 
under this section in any 12'monlh period may not exceed $100,000." (emphasis 
supplied). 
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"[a]vailability of the exemption under this section does not depend 
upon delivery to any purchaser of any specific disclosure document by 
the issuer."303 Although no specific form of disclosure is mandated as a 
condition of the exemption, the issuer remains subject to the antifraud 
provisions of the Act. In fact, the Local Issuer Exemption may be un-
derstood as reliance on the issuer's fear of fraud liability as the major 
source of investor protection in these limited offerings. 
b. The General Transactional Exemption 
The General Transactional Exemption contained in section D is a 
much broader exemption. It imposes no ceiling on the aggregate offer-
ing price; the local or nonlocal character of the issuer is irrelevant; it 
imposes no limit on the size of the issuer; and it is available to a greater 
variety of issuers. Subsection D(l) provides that the exemption may be 
used by a corporation, a partnership, or a real estate investment trust 
(REITV04 Not all securities issued by these entities, however, may be 
exempted under section D. The exemption is available only for the 
following securities issued by these entities: "any note, stock, bond, 
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, voting trust certificate, share of 
beneficial interest of a real estate investment trust, partnership interest, 
any warrant or right to purchase or subscribe for a security listed above 
or any security convertible into a security listed above."305 
This limitation has the effect of excluding investment contracts 
from automatic eligibility on the theory that this type of security is 
most often used in the more exotic and dubious offerings.306 Subsec-
tion D(l) makes this limitation effective by restricting not only the type 
of issuer, but also the type of security that may be covered by the ex-
emption. Accordingly, a corporation or a partnership will have auto-
matic eligibility for an offering of its conventional debt or equity 
securities under section D, but not for an investment contract offering. 
The Rulemaking Committee and the Division recognized, however, 
that not all investment contracts represent a threat to investors, and 
that corporations, partnerships, and REITs are not the only legitimate 
issuers. Subsection D(l) adds that the "Commissioner may by order 
extend the exemption provided by this section to other types of securi-
ties and other types of issuers in any case in which he determines that 
to do so would not be inconsistent with the public interest."307 The 
effect of subsection B(l) is that non-specified issuers have the burden of 
seeking this order from the Commissioner. 
The General Transactional Exemption also allows the issuer to sell 
303. Id. § .02.04.09C(4). 
304. Id. § .02.04.09D(I). 
305. Id. 
306. State administrators have long emphasized regulation of these forms of invest-
ments. See Long, supra note 37, at 543. 
307. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit .. 02, § .02.04.09D(I) (1984). 
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to more than ten purchasers-thirty-five in this state.308 Because this 
number is also calculated in accordance with subsection B(6), the ac-
tual number of purchasers may be significantly greater than thirty-five. 
The issuer using this exemption, like the issuer using the Local Issuer 
Exemption, need only establish reasonable belief as to the number of 
purchasers. Section D then will allow exemption of a fairly substantial 
offering, subject only to section D(3)'s disclosure requirements and sec-
tion B's provision on integration, sales remuneration, investment in-
tent, general solicitation and advertising, and bad boy disqualifications. 
In addition, subsection B(7)'s notice filing requirement is triggered only 
if the aggregate offering price exceeds $100,000. 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the General Transactional 
Exemption (indeed, of Regulation 9 as a whole) is its abandonment of 
offeree and purchaser suitability standards. The issuer wishing to rely 
on this exemption will not have to satisfy itself that either the offerees 
or the purchasers have the sophistication requisite to understanding the 
merits of the investment, or that they are capable of bearing the eco-
nomic risk. The application of subjective suitability standards was long 
a problem in section 4(2) and Rule 146 transactions,309 and they cre-
ated similar problems in Maryland under Rule S_7.310 The problems 
with satisfaction of suitability standards are familiar to all issuer's 
counsel. The sophistication requirement was perhaps the most trouble-
some, since the definition of "sophistication" was enormously elu-
sive.3Il The assessment of risk-bearing ability was perhaps easier to 
make,312 but presented a substantial practical problem: the prospective 
purchaser might resent the seller's inquiry into his financial status. 
These difficulties were compounded by an additional problem; suitabil-
ity had to be established at the offeree as well as the purchaser level,313 
An offer to a single unsuitable person thus might destroy the exemption 
for the entire offering,314 a particularly harsh result since an unsuitable 
offeree who has not purchased a security has not been harmed. 
The Rulemaking Committee acknowledged all of these problems 
by excluding from Regulation 9 offeree or purchaser suitability as a 
condition of the exemption.315 Suitability only plays a modest role in 
308. Id. § .02.04.09D(2). 
309. See generally Soraghan, Private Offerings: Determining "Access," "Investment So-
phistication," and "Abr1ity to Bear Economic Risk," 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1980) (dis-
cussing techniques of complying with the suitability requirement); Section 4(2), 
supra note 104, at 491-95 (providing guidelines for application of the suitability 
standard). 
310. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07D (rescinded 1983). 
311. See Soraghan, supra note 309, at 20-27; Section 4(2), supra note 104, at 492-93. 
312. See Soraghan, supra note 309, at 27-34. 
313. See MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.03.07D(l) (rescinded 1983). 
314. For evaluation of this possibility under the statutory section 4(2) exemption, see 
Section 4(2), supra note 104, at 493-94. 
315. q. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (1983) (applying a sophistication suitability stan-
dard to the 35 nonaccredited investors). 
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the General Transactional Exemption's disclosure provisions. 
Subsection 0(3) requires the issuer to take one of four options: 
(1) delivery of a "Form MO-2, or a disclosure document containing the 
information required by this form, to each purchaser prior to any sale 
to the purchaser;316 (2) sale only to accredited investors; (3) sale only to 
persons whom the issuer reasonably believes are sophisticated investors 
or investors with economic risk-bearing ability and a purchaser repre-
sentative;317 or (4) sale only to a combination of the persons in catego-
ries (2) and (3). In essence, the issuer can avoid the question of 
suitability by delivering a relatively simple disclosure document to each 
purchaser. This should have the effect of encouraging issuers to pro-
duce this kind of disclosure. The result could be fewer practical 
problems for the issuer, a higher level of blue sky compliance, and 
more investor protection318 through timely and meaningful disclosure. 
If, however, the issuer using the General Transactional exemption 
is able to sell only to accredited or "suitable" inve~tors, it will not have 
to deliver a disclosure document as a condition of the exemption; only 
the sale319 to a nonaccredited or "unsuitable" investor will trigger the 
disclosure requirement. If the issuer is a corporation, it may use Form 
MO-2.320 Form MO-2 is a simplified, fill-in-the blank disclosure form. 
Although every issuer should rely ~n experienced counsel in complet-
ing Form MO-2, the form is designed to help both the seller and the 
buyer understand the information being disclosed. It will permit, in-
deed encourage, the businessperson to take a more active role in the 
disclosure process. As a result, it represents a major innovation and a 
departure from a tradition of securities regulation that mandates the 
production of repetitive, unreadable, and unread boilerplate disclo-
sure.321 Only actual use of the form will determine whether the inno-
vation is successful, but it is intended to make the disclosure process 
more meaningful to both the investor and the issuer. 
Form MD-2 requires the following specific information: the secur-
ities being offered; the use of the offering proceeds; the business of the 
316. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09D(3)(a)(i) (1984). 
317. See id. § .02.04.09A(8) (defining purchaser representative). 
318. Rule S-7 (1974) contained no disclosure requirement, but required the issuer's 
reasonable belief in both offeree and purchaser suitability. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
.02, § .02.03.07D (rescinded 1983). 
319. Only the purchaser's suitability is relevant to this requirement. See supra text ac-
companying notes 316-17. 
320. Copies of Form MD-2 may be obtained from the Division. 
321. For a critique of the SEC's disclosure system, see H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND COR-
PORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979); see also R. 
KARMEL, REGULATION By PROSECUTION: THE SEC V. CORPORATE AMERICA 
(1982). For an important, recent reevaluation of these and other critiques of fed-
eral disclosure policy, see Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corpo-
rate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1 (1983); see also Sargent, Book Review, 12 
U. BALT. L. REV. 371 (1982) (reviewing R. KARMEL, supra, and J. SELIGMAN, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (1982». 
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issuer; the risk factors associated with the business; the organizational 
history of the issuer; the identity and remuneration of persons selling 
the securities; the identity and background of the managers and owners 
of the issuer; possible conflicts of interest; remuneration of manage-
ment; recent distributions by the issuer; recent securities issuances; the 
terms of payment for the securities being offered; the expiration date of 
the offering; prior issuance of securities to insiders at a price lower than 
the offering price; and the terms of any escrow of the proceeds of the 
offering. In addition to the foregoing, Item 19 of Form MD-2 requires 
the issuer, as a condition of the exemption, to provide various forms of 
financial data. The amount and type of financial disclosure varies with 
the length of time the issuer has been in operation and the availability 
of certified financial statements.322 
As mentioned above, only corporations may use Form MD-2. 
Limited partnerships and other issuers are currently required to fashion 
a disclosure document that will provide equivalent information in an 
appropriate form. These documents need not track Form MD-2's fill-
in-the-blank format. The Division plans to publish a form for use by 
limited partnerships after a period of experimentation with Form MD-
2. 
Although the use of Form MD-2 or its equivalent is unnecessary 
when the issuer sells only to accredited or sophisticated investors, sub-
section D(2)(b)323 requires another form of disclosure to all investors 
whenever the issuer has previously issued "cheap stock" (stock sold at a 
price twenty-five percent lower than the offering price) to insiders324 or 
does not intend to escrow the entire proceeds of the offering until com-
pletion of the offering.325 In essence, the issuer is required specially to 
disclose to all investors the existence of this cheap stock or the lack of 
escrow. Part II of Form MD-2 may be used for that purpose.326 These 
special disclosure requirements reflect the risks to investors that some-
times arise when the proceeds of the offering may be used before the 
offering is completed, and when the insiders have paid less for their 
equity position than the outside investors.327 
These provisions do not represent a movement of the Division to-
ward merit regulation. Although cheap stock is a traditional merit con-
322. See Form MD-2, Item 19 (copy available from the Division). 
323. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit .. 02, § .02.04.09D(3)(b)(i) (1984). 
324. The category of insiders consists of officers, directors, general partners, and pro-
moters of the issuer. Id. § .02.04.09D(2)(b)(i). 
325. Id. § .02.04.09(3)(b)(ii). 
326. Form MD-2, Part II will allow simple, short form disclosure of either of those two 
facts. 
327. For an explanation of why cheap stock provisions are applied by merit regulators 
in the context of a registered offering, see Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There 
Merit in the Merit Requirements?, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 79, 90-93; Hueni, Application 
0/ Merit Requirements in State Securities Regulation, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1417, 
1423-28 (1969); Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899, 912-13 
(1982). 
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cern, subsection D(2)(b) merely imposes a special disclosure 
requirement,328 one that tempers the liberality of this exemption with-
out imposing a substantial compliance burden upon the issuer. 
4. Limits on the Applicability of Regulation 9 
Regulation 9 ends with a simple statement of its scope. Subsection 
E(1)329 provides that the exemption is not available to any offering reg-
istered under the 1933 Act or exempted under Regulation A. Both 
types of offering, of course, may be registered by coordination. Subsec-
tion E(2)330 declares the unavailability of Regulation 9 for Rule 505 
and 506 offerings, both of which may be exempted by coordination 
under Regulation 15. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is perhaps too early to judge the effectiveness of the current 
Maryland exemptive regime. In any event, no conclusions can be 
drawn without empirical analysis of use, compliance, costs, and pat-
terns of fraudulent activity.331 The Maryland experience as a whole, 
328. A comparison of the cheap stock provision of Reg. 9 and the cheap stock restric-
tions recommended by NASAA for lise by merit states in connection with regis-
tered public offerings will make this distinction clear. See NASAA Statement of 
Policy on Cheap Stock, I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ~ 5312 (Apr. 23, 1983). 
329. MD. ADMIN. CODE tit. .02, § .02.04.09E(l) (1984). 
330. Id. § .02.04.09E(2). 
331. The SEC has been criticized for its failure to "publish any study concerning the 
incidence of fraud among issuers employing the small issue and private placement 
exemptions." Seligman, supra note 321, at 60. Seligman adds: 
[T]he statutory responsibility of the SEC in administering the 1933 
Securities Act is to protect investors. To so substantially expand the 
small business exemptions without publication of any analysis of the 
problem this may create for investors represents an ignorance of this 
mandate and of the problems that led to the passage of the 1933 Securi-
ties Act. 
Id. at 60-61 (citations omitted). Empirical study of patterns of fraudulent activity 
should also be conducted at the state level. This is especially necessary in light of 
the heavy use of Reg. 9 and Reg. 15. Between July I, 1982 and December 15, 
1983, approximately 1,500 Reg. 15 notice filings were made with the Division, 
used in connection with offerings totaling more than $11.5 billion. In the same 
period, 135 Reg. 9 notice filings were made, used in connection with offerings 
totaling more than $114 million. Release No. 24, supra note 149, at 25,582. If the 
extensive use of Regulation D and parallel state exemptions can be shown to have 
caused an increase in securities fraud, then the premises of the exemptive system 
will have to be rethought. Particular attention will have to be focused on the 
effects of the reduction or elimination of specific disclosure requirements, the 
deemphasis of purchaser sophistication requirements, the SEC's deferral to state 
regulation in the context of Rule 504 offerings, the dramatic increase in dollar 
ceilings on the aggregate offering price, the presumption of suitability for certain 
accredited investors, and the extensive use of these exemptions by tax advantaged 
syndications rather than small corporate issuers. Although this article has oper-
ated under the assumption that the changes in the federal and state law represent 
a needed rationalization and expansion of the exemptive schemes, it must be cau-
tioned that the results of these experiments should be closely monitored. 
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however, may contain some lessons for the treatment of limited and 
private offerings in every state. For example, the principle of exemp-
tion by coordination reflects one key technique of reducing securities 
compliance costs: reduction of duplicative or unnecessarily inconsistent 
state regulation. Application of this principle may require the state to 
abandon some of their traditional restraints on these exemptions; the 
Maryland experiment may demonstrate that some of these restraints 
were not only costly, but relatively unimportant from an investor pro-
tection standpoint. 
Similarly, the Maryland experience may demonstrate the value of 
flexibility. Regulation 9 sets very specific limits on the number of pur-
chasers and the number of beneficial owners of local issuers, imposes 
clear restrictions on sales remuneration, and requires specific disclosure 
to nonaccredited investors and investors who do not meet suitability 
standards. In all of these cases, however, the issuer need only establish 
its reasonable belief as to compliance-a valuable counterweight to the 
threat of strict liability that would result from failure to satisfy all the 
conditions of the exemption. The same kind of flexibility is implicit in 
the special order mechanisms, which give the issuer the opportunity to 
persuade the Commissioner to issue an exemptive order on the basis of 
a good faith effort to comply, or to extend eligibility for the General 
Transactional Exemption to issuers not specifically covered by that ex-
emption. Bright lines, strict standards, and absolute limits may pro-
duce predictability, but they do not always allow the law to 
accommodate the dynamic and unexpected character of capital forma-
tion. The element of flexibility built into the Maryland rules may do 
so. 
Finally, the Maryland experience reflects the need to experiment 
with different means of balancing the needs of capital formation and 
investor protection. There is no single way to protect investors; their 
needs vary with the nature of the investor, the type of security, the size 
of the offering, the identity of the salespersons, the manner of the offer-
ing, and the nature of the issuer. Their needs may be met by treating 
different issuers and securities differently, by imposing different disclo-
sure requirements under different circumstances, and by requiring 
some kinds of offerings to satisfy more exemptive conditions. The crux, 
however, is that not every exemptive condition and every technique of 
investor protection should apply to every transaction. In some con-
texts, a particular condition may not only be burdensome to the issuer, 
but relatively useless to the investor. In others, the condition may be 
very useful and its burdensome aspects justifiable. Only experimenta-
tion, empirical analysis of the incidence of fraud and investor abuse in 
exempt transactions, and open minds will make the right choices 
possible. 
